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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Randy L Robinson 
Petitioner / Appellee 
v. 
Alexander Earl Baggett 
Respondent / 
Appellant 
Appeal No. 20100197-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)(h) and Utah R. App. P. 3(a). (Stating that the Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over "appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases") and 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a) (an appeal may only be taken from "final orders and judgments, 
except as otherwise provided by law.") 
A final Order denying Respondent/Appellant's Motion for Rule 60 Relief from 
Judgment or Order was entered in this matter on February 4, 2010 by District Court 
Judge Paul G Maughan. (See Minute Entry dated February 4, 2010 by Judge Paul 
Maughan, R. 1914-1917, Addendum.) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether a final, and appealable Order has been entered by the District 
Court. 
Standard of Review: "The determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law." Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 v. Utah 
Transit Authu 2004 UT App 310, ^ 6, 99 P.3d 379; see also Houghton v. Department of 
Health, 2005 UT 63, Tf 16, 125 P.3d 860 ("T]he issue of subject matter jurisdiction i s a 
threshold issue,' which can be raised at any time and must be addressed before the merits 
of other claims.") 
Issue II: Did the Court abuse its discretion in denying Alexander Earl Baggetfs 
second Rule 60(b) Motion? 
Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] review[s] a district court's denial of a 
rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion." Jones v 
Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ^ 10, 214 P.3d 859. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following rules, statutes, and cases are determinative to this appeal and are 
reproduced in their entirety in Addendum A to this brief: 
• Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
• Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
• Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Trial was held on June 15 and 16, 2005 before the Honorable Stephen L Roth. 
The Trial Court entered a Memorandum Decision on January 4, 2006. On April 11, 
2008, the Court entered its Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce (hereafter the 
"Decree") having received no objection. The Respondent, Alexander Earl Baggett, filed 
a Motion for Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) Relief on April 28, 2008. (See Motion for Rule 
59(e) or Rule 60(b) Relief, R. 1371-1373, Addendum.) The Motion was denied. The 
Court determined that Baggett's failure to timely object to the proposed Decree was 
inexcusable. He was clearly informed that the proposed Decree had been submitted to 
the Court. 
On July 10, 2008, Baggett again attempted to set aside the Decree by filing 
another Motion for Rule 60 Relief from Judgment or Order. (See Motion for Rule 60 
Relief from Judgment or Order (Hearing Requested), R. 1684-1686, Addendum.) At the 
October 23, 2008 hearing on this motion, Judge Faust did not rule on Baggett's Motion. 
He urged the parties to try to resolve Baggett's objections. 
After nearly fifteen (15) months of further negotiation proved unsuccessful, 
Baggett filed a Request to Submit for Decision on his second Motion for Rule 60 Relief 
from Judgment or Order. During this period, the Honorable Judge Paul G Maughan was 
assigned to this case. On February 4, 2010, Judge Maughan, relying on the parties' 
detailed written submissions, and the record, denied Baggett's second Rule 60 Motion. 
On March 5, 2010, Baggett filed this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The petitioner, Randy L Robinson (hereafter "Robinson"), an attorney, and the 
respondent, Alexander Earl Baggett (hereafter "Baggett"), a FedEx pilot, were married in 
Utah on December 31, 1995. In March 2003, Robinson filed a Petition for Divorce. 
2. This matter was tried to the Honorable Stephen L Roth on June 15 and 16, 2005. 
At the close of trial on June 16th the proceedings were bifurcated at the request of 
Baggett as he was attempting to get a Green Card for Sonia Martin, who resided in 
Brazil. See R. 862-64. 
3. Final briefing and arguments were made June 29, 2005, and that same day the 
Court granted the divorce with all other matters "reserved for final ruling by this Court... 
including Petitioner's arguments regarding fault." See R. 872-75. The parties' marriage 
lasted a total of 114 months. 
4. On August 29, 2005, Judge Roth issued a Minute Entry regarding post-separation 
income and after-acquired property as it related to "dissipation" of those funds and its 
relevancy to issues of property division. Judge Roth indicated that the Court has "broad 
equitable powers in this area" but requested the parties' counsel to provide briefs on this 
issue within twenty (20) days. See 877-88. 
5. On January 4, 2006, Judge Roth entered his Memorandum Decision. See R. 913-
49. 
6. In this Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled on various issues including 
alimony, dissipation, and contempt. The court awarded Robinson alimony in the net 
amount of $1,882.00 net per month but further indicated that due to the tax effect on 
4 
RtiltuiMfii the •iiiinijfit ilhHild \u iiiij'mt'iilnl In an additional amount to take care of the 
tax effect of this award on Robinson. Judge Roth ordered the parties to address this issue 
in the proposed findings. R.943. 
7 Ji idge R otl 1 :PII tut: t l lei i i ll z- i tl lat tl: le i ilii i 10.11 :t> i ;:l1 'as t : be • paid for a period equal to the 
length ui the marriage (114 luonilis) and concluded tlkr due to Baggetf s failine '*to pay 
ilk amounts agreed !<> and ordered as temporary support . ilia. ; >,-* reasonah . and 
equitat:,.. ius; •, fulfilled 
<^  M-on.Vnf s ciimioir ^K!iu:M«Mr " h! Ua^uetl was gixen a credit of tue lu- ^ 2) months 
towards the 1 i -nomhs term of alimony. Judge Roth did not state when alimony should 




 T.-I".' * • »-> ,• \ I M ihi\s, aiici the date oi this Decision, the period of 
alimony payment will begin w\\\\ June 2003". Id. Baggett failed to pay the arrears within 
the forty-five i4 "••) days. 
8 Ji iilgt • i id. tl iat Baggett failed to make.his "required payments under the • 
temporary Order for considerable time. " The Court further found that Baggett "knew 
of his obligations unuci 11 »c *'emporan (>idei. had llu mean I- lullill Ihen id 
maleriiiHv fail* 'I ir \\\)\\\\\ iih ihr ( >n|er" and found him in contempt of the Court 's 
Order. R. 945. As a result of Baggett 's contempt, Judge Roth stated that he was inclined 
to sentence Baggett to thirty (30 . <\A\ . m jau .is an appropriate sanui-.u.. <* i . 
suspended -n ll undid-, in ol *... - , • '-. < our fs Orders and left it to 
the parties' discretion as to whether that be made a part oi tlu- final Order or whether they 
silould schedule a hearing to address sentencing on the contempt. R. 945 4ft 
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9. Judge Roth ordered Robinson's counsel to prepare Findings of Fact, and 
Conclusions of Law and an Order which "should include additional Findings and 
Conclusions from the evidence presented reasonably, necessary to support the Court's 
Ruling or to include other necessary and customary provisions." R. 948. Judge Roth 
recognized that the Court tried to make Rulings on all issues presented for decision at 
trial but acknowledged that some issues may not have been resolved by his Memorandum 
Decision and invited counsel to advise the Court if any issues had not been resolved by 
the Memorandum Decision. IcL 
10. For approximately eight (8) months, the parties tried to negotiate terms of 
proposed Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and an Order. 
11. Unable to reach an agreement the parties submitted their positions to the Court for 
a Ruling on or about September 1, 2006. See R.952-1016. During that interim period, 
Judge Roth was transferred from the Salt Lake City Department to the West Jordan 
Department. Ultimately, on January 1, 2007 Judge Robert Faust was assigned to the 
case. See R.1025-1028. The parties stated that Respondent has objected to the proposed 
Findings, Conclusions, and Decree and that the parties have been unable to resolve their 
differences because "some of the differences persist simply because the Ruling of Judge 
Roth may require some interpretation, or is at least subject to different interpretations by 
the parties." R.1025. On January 1, 2007, the Honorable Judge Robert Hilder, acting as 
the presiding judge, referred this matter back to Judge Roth for the sole purpose of 
resolving the "Respondent's objections to the proposed Findings, Conclusions, and 
Decree and that upon the resolution of those issues by Judge Roth the matter would be 
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reassigned or i c: i i laiii • v itl i Ii ldge Fai ist " See R. 1047-1048, On April 11, 200' 7, Robinson 
filed her response to Baggetf s objection to the form of the proposed Decree. See 
R.1057-1117, On or about \ | \obinson made a request i M DUL 
ai},»iiiiHiit reganliiui llit* fiHiposnt I'mdingv <'tun lirdn i >. and Decree. See R. 1118-1307 
12. On July 11, 2007, a hearing was held before the I Ionorable Judge Koil t'Si •, 
Transcript from Ilearing Jul"* 11 ^00n bel.n\ MUIL.^  s - WI- i -IIL ,>et iicncran\ 
I"1"!'!! Addendum.) NIL- < - - - > • n tested
 : 
issues ; ding but not limited to, the inclusion and amount of life insurance, Id. at 1.4., 
"whether or m < Raggett should get the advantage of the favorable treatment under tlie 
Court's v;i\kN -M*-I , . c s l_t]L At 1 u. .n-d 
the effvtiw date lor purposes of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDROs) id, 
at 23. and alimon\. JUT
 v ~ '
 l
 lowever. die primary issue before the Court deal! \\ uh 
"whether or not we're going to comproim •<. » ,:.uuut *• !- r , ' s 
goiiig in be a dad of w hem '\ ri (Ins Decree is actually signed" for the effective date of the 
Rulings set forth in the 2006 Memoranduin Decision. Id... at 25. 
H Judge Roth determined that there should ne son;. -. >tnah>., -•>{>•, - • o 
> parties. Id at 13-16. JudeeRoth 
addressed the primary issue before the Court (the effective dale of the Decree). I N 
Court observed that there might be several dates wined v^a. .K. UVJU, stating me 
Milurcaled Dccrv nl'Divoiu' dal*. nl ln.il dulc ol n\\ Kiilm:1, and dale of entrv ol the 
final Order." Id. a!.2_7_- Judge Roth further stated that the date of ruling and die dak x^f 
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entry of the final Order are "dictated by events and they're not directly related to the 
merits of the case". Id. 
14. Judge Roth then addressed whether Baggett should get the advantage of favorable 
treatment under the Court's Order without performing obligations as set forth in the 
Order. Judge Roth indicated that Baggett was "trying to get the benefit of the 
Ruling.. .without having attempted to comply fully with it" Id. The Court stated further 
that if Baggett had "made some good faith attempt to sort of equalize the situation, I'd be 
more sympathetic to — to his request here that we choose an earlier date for that". Id. at 
27:21-24. Judge Roth found that Baggett appeared "to have been trying to have his cake 
and eat it too on this basis, and I simply don't think that that's appropriate." Id. 27 - 28. 
15. Judge Roth then addressed the issue of fault and how that issue supported his 
Ruling. Judge Roth specifically stated that "the Respondent's [Baggett's] somewhat 
immature dealings with his relationships and responsibilities of this process, seem to me 
to be compounded by the request that you're now making". See Id. at 28. Subsequently, 
Judge Roth specifically ruled that "[Baggett] should not further benefit from what has 
been actions of his that in an equitable context are very negative, that do involve some 
fault on his part that have increased the amount of money that is a monthly and full 
burden to [Robinson]. And therefore, I am finding that the divisions of my decision will 
take effect as of the date the supplemental Decree was signed". See Id. at 28-29:3-5. 
16. Judge Roth then stated that the date to be used to divide retirement accounts was a 
separate issue and that as the valuation for these accounts were given at trial then it 
8 
seemed uppropi 1.1U U i A (In \ .liii.tlinn dales .^ \A llic dale of the 2006 Memorandum 
Decision for that discrete purpose. Id. at 29. 
17.T1 le parties once again tried to negotiate terms such as the amount of life insurai ice 
and gross alii i ion> I I le parties decide cl it > * < a s best to s" ibi i lit I'll: leii respective p ositions to. 
tin* i rial Court for a final decision. 
18.On March 5, 2008, Baggett was served with an Amended Supplement- \ iaumgs 
of Facts and I OUCIUMOIIS ol I »i^  and lln Deuce S u K.I Mi I I I 
]\ 1 aircl i 12, 2008. Baggett's counsel notified Robinson's counsel that he was still in 
disagreement with the proposed Orders anu would call Robinson's counsel on March 13, 
°009 t«. j i ^ u s s these issues, liaggeu s counsu i> » < < < •.. • . ^ r i • 
-• — • -d i! icJore the ^uuii see k.1390-139*. ^u 
March 21, 200b, u\cr a week aftei IU*I hearing from Baggett >  counsel. Robinson'^ 
counsel phoned Baggett's counsel m an attempt to resoh v UK. ^naming I^SIK 
.'-\ " ! i= !v*m.lining three (3) issues 
raised hv Ba^ 'cu . bee 11.1393-1395. In die letter which was sent \ ia faesinnlc and 
regular mail, Robinson's counsel reiterates the parties' agreement Uiu. ,$aggci, wouic 
icspond In Man Hi H)
 mH)i)y iiiiillii iir\ n|t|i i linns w Im III Uai'ijeii bad I" ihv paperwork 
which was served on him on March 5, 2008. Id, i39r-. ] hi.s date was set so that the 
parties could frame any issues for the Court's attention and >uhmn Kohmson s proposed 
Amended Supplei i lei ital F in; idii igs ::»f Facts and Cot icli isiol is of I -aw an :i tl le Decree . 
iv. On March 28, 2008 after Baggett had failed to send written objections to the 
proposed final documents as set forth in the March 21 2008 letter, Robinson's counsel 
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sent a letter to Baggett's counsel requesting that Baggett file a formal response to the 
draft of the final divorce documents sent on March 5, 2008. See R.1397. In the final 
sentence of the March 28, 2008 letter, Robinson's counsel indicated that he was "inclined 
to submit the paperwork to the Court next Wednesday, April 2". Subsequently, counsel 
for the parties discussed the deadlines in a phone conversation on March 28, 2008. 
Baggett's counsel sent a letter dated March 28, 2008 to Robinson's counsel 
memorializing the earlier telephone conversation and stating that Baggett would have the 
objection to Robinson's counsel "no later than Tuesday, April 1st". See R. 1399. 
20. After failing to receive any objection from Baggett's counsel on April 1, 2008, 
Robinson's counsel submitted the Orders to the Court on April 3, 2008 See R. 1341. 
Despite proper notice and close to a month in which to file objections with the Court, 
Baggett failed to timely object to the Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree. 
21. On April 11, 2008, the Court, through the Honorable Robert P Faust, signed and 
entered the Orders. See R. 1322-70. 
The Alimony Provision in the April 11, 2008 Orders 
22. The alimony provisions in the Orders as entered on the April 11, 2008 accurately 
reflect the Court's alimony Rulings as made at the June 2005 trial, detailed in the January 
2006 Memorandum Decision, and clarified at the July 2007 hearing. The Court found 
that the parties' marriage had lasted 114 months. In the Memorandum Decision issued 
by Judge Roth in January of 2006, Judge Roth specifically stated that alimony was to be 
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paid for a period equal to the length of the marriage but did not state a commencement 
date. See R.943 
23. Judge Roth also found that, due to Baggett's failure to pay the "amounts agreed to 
and ordered as temporary support," it was reasonable and equitable that Baggett should 
be given only one (1) year "credit" against his alimony obligation. See Id. 
24. The parties' ongoing disputes resulted in the July 2007 hearing which requested 
clarification from Judge Roth regarding his Rulings. 
25. At that hearing, one of the primary issues raised was the date by which the Court's 
Ruling of January, 2006, Memorandum Decision, would take effect. See R. 1924 at 25. 
In considering this issue, the Court indicated that there were several dates that "might be 
perfect here, and all we've talked about is the Bifurcated Decree of Divorce, date of trail, 
date of my Ruling, and date of entry of the final Order." See R. 1924 at 27. After 
carefully considering Baggett's failure to comply with the Court's Rulings, and 
"faultness," Judge Roth ruled "that all divisions of my decision will take effect as of the 
date the Decree was signed." See ID. at 27 - 29. Alimony was to be paid for a period of 
102 months from the date of the Decree, April 11, 2008. 
Baggett's Motions For Relief From the April 11, 2008 Orders 
26. April 4, 2008 Baggett received notice that Robinson had filed the Amended 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree, which had been 
hand delivered to Baggett's counsel on March 5, 2008. April 11, 2008 the Court entered 
the Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Baggett never 
objected to the April 11, 2008 Orders before entry. 
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27. April 28, 2008 Baggett's counsel filed a Motion for Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) 
Relief. See R.1371-73. Baggett argued that he was entitled to a new trial on the grounds 
that there were irregularities in the proceedings. See R.1374 - 79; Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(a)(1), (a)(3). Alternatively, Baggett argued that he should be relieved from the 
judgment on the basis of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(1); See R. 1379-80. After reviewing the parties' written submissions, 
Judge Faust ruled on Baggett's Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) Motion. (Minute Entry dated 
June 27, 2008 by Judge Robert Faust, R. 1502 - 06, Addendum.) Judge Faust found that 
Baggett's failure to timely object to the proposed Decree was inexcusable. See R. 1504; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The Court further determined that Baggett could not rely on 
surprise or mistake "because by April 4, 2008 by the latest, he was clearly informed that 
the proposed Decree had been submitted to the Court." See id. Judge Faust determined 
that it was "satisfied that there are no legal or factual grounds to grant [Baggett's] 
requested relief, even assuming that his Motion is timely and procedurally appropriate." 
See R. 1504 (emphasis added); See Utah R. Civ. P 59(a)(1). The Court denied 
Baggett's Motion for Rule 59(e) or 60(b) Relief in its entirety. See id. 
28. July 10, 2008, Baggett filed another Motion for Rule 60 Relief from Judgment or 
Order, this time asserting that relief was warranted as a result of either "fraud..., 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party," satisfaction of the judgment, 
or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." R. 1684-
1686. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), 5 - 6 . 
12 
29. October 23, 2008, a hearing was held to resolve Baggett's second Rule 60 Motion. 
(See Transcript from Proceeding, October 23, 2008, before Judge Robert Faust, R. 1876: 
R. 1923, Addendum.) At the beginning of the hearing, Judge Faust indicated that he was 
"not sure quite how to tackle this". See R. 1923 at 3:14. Judge Faust then went on to 
state that after reviewing the courtesy copies provided by the parties' counsel, it seemed 
to him that Judge Roth would be in a better position to make a ruling on the issues "if it 
gets that far, as to the clarification issues that he intended and where he was going on it." 
Id at 3:22 - 24. Judge Faust then went on to state that "I have given some thought, and 
assuming that we got over the hurdle and granted the Motion — assuming that, I'm not 
saying we will - but assuming that if whether or not I would be required to keep and 
handle it or whether I could approach Judge Roth and have him take a look at it." Id at 
4:7-12 (emphasis added). Judge Faust then stated "but what I thought we would do is 
just simply handle the threshold issue of whether or not to grant [Baggett's Rule 60] 
Motion or not." ID at 5:17-24. Judge Faust further states that if he did grant Baggett's 
Rule 60 Motion, then he "was tinkering with the idea of asking both [parties] to go back 
one last time and get the Order completely consistent with what Judge Roth had asked." 
ID at 5:21-24. Judge Faust outlined what he would do if he granted Baggett's Rule 60 
Motion for Relief. The parties then agreed that they would attempt to resolve Baggett's 
contentions regarding the Decree entered on April 11, 2008. In a spirit of cooperation, 
Robinson's counsel stated that "we're happy to go through this process, we think it will 
succeed, but I would hate to have anybody think or suggest later that my client's 
agreeability to this approach is in any sort of a waiver to her legal arguments." ID at 
13 
16:18-22. There was never a time in which Robinson stipulated to set aside the Decree 
entered on April 11, 2008. Judge Faust never ruled on Baggett's second Rule 60 Motion 
but reserved ruling in hopes the parties could settled. 
30. In an effort to avoid further litigation, Robinson attempted to negotiate in good 
faith with Baggett to resolve his objections to the provisions of the Decree entered on 
April 11, 2008. When the parties were not able to reach an agreement regarding 
Baggett's objections, Baggett filed a Request to Submit for Decision on January 25, 
2010. See R. 1911-1913. 
31. Judge Paul Maughan was assigned to the case replacing Judge Robert P Faust. On 
February 4, 2010, after reviewing the parties' written submissions, Judge Maughan ruled 
on Baggett's second Rule 60 Motion. See R. 1914 - 1917. Judge Maughan made 
specific findings regarding Baggett's Motion. Judge Maughan noted that Baggett's 
"present Motion is effectively a renewal by [Baggett] of his prior Motion seeking relief 
under Rule 60(b), which Judge Faust, .. .denied in a Minute Entry decision dated June 27, 
2008." Id. Judge Maughan then went on to state that Baggett was trying to take a 
different tack by arguing that his current Rule 60 Motion "is based not on excusable 
neglect, but rather that the Decree did not accurately reflect the Court's (through Judge 
Roth) substantive Rulings and, in fact, contains certain provisions that are "violations of 
the law"." Id, Judge Maughan found that Baggett, "having failed to timely file an 
Objection" was attempting to "circumvent that process by instead seeking relief under the 
auspices of Rule 60(b)." I(L Finally, Judge Maughan ruled that "from a more 
substantive standpoint, the Court is not persuaded by [Baggett's] argument that the 
14 
Decree does not accurately reflect Judge Roth's extensive Rulings. Aside from his 
arguments regarding the form of the Decree, [Baggett] is essentially mounting a 
challenge to the legal merits of certain of Judge Roth's opinions." See Id. Judge 
Maughan found that "this is precisely the type of perceived legal error which [Baggett] 
should have raised through a timely appeal and that Rule 60(b) was not the appropriate 
vehicle for Baggett to raise his challenges to Judge Roth's Rulings and "is not a substitute 
for appeal". See Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
On April 11, 2008 the Honorable Robert P Faust entered a Decree. The Decree, 
which was entered on that date, is the final judgment from which an appeal could have 
been taken. No appeal was taken. 
The Respondent/Appellant Baggett moved twice to set aside the Decree. 
On April 28, 2008, Baggett filed a Motion for Rule 59(e) or 60(b) Relief. On June 
27, 2008, Judge Faust denied Baggett's Motion for Rule 59(e) or 60(b) Relief making 
clear findings that Baggett had failed to show excusable neglect in filing a timely 
objection to the Decree. No appeal was taken. 
On July 10, 2008, Baggett filed a second motion entitled Motion for Rule 60 
Relief from Judgment or Order. At the hearing held on October 23, 2008 on Baggett's 
Motion for Rule 60 Relief from Judgment or Order, Judge Faust did not make a Ruling 
regarding the second Rule 60 motion but directed the parties to negotiate. Baggett 
submitted his second Motion for Decision. 
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On February 4, 2010, Judge Paul G Maughan denied Respondent's second Motion 
for Rule 60 Relief. This is the only Order that Baggett has appealed for that purpose 
alone it should be considered a "final Order". 
Baggett argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion by denying Baggett's 
second Rule 60 Motion. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion because the alimony 
award as set forth in the Decree entered on April 11, 2008 accurately reflects the Court's 
Ruling that Robinson should receive alimony for a period of 102 months beginning on 
the date of entry of the Decree. This award was clearly set forth in the record as outlined 
in the Rulings of the 2006 Memorandum Decision and July 11, 2007 hearing. Robinson 
did not misrepresent nor was there a clerical error in the language of the Decree entered 
in April 2008. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS 
APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT HAS ENTERED A FINAL 
ORDER DENYING THE SECOND RULE 60 MOTION. 
Pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure an appeal may 
only be taken "from.. .final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law." 
Utah R. App. P. 3(a). The final judgment rule "prevents a party from prematurely 
appealing a non final judgment," and Utah Courts "have repeatedly affirmed the viability 
of the judgment rule as a barrier to [appellate] jurisdiction." Loffredo v Holt, 2001 UT 
97,111, 37 P. 3d 1070. 
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In this case, there is a final judgment or order from which an appeal can be taken. 
On April 11, 2008, the Honorable Robert P Faust entered the Decree. See R. 1322 - 70. 
Baggett failed to timely file an objection to the proposed Orders. After the Decree was 
entered, Baggett could have appealed. He failed to file a timely appeal and filed two (2) 
Rule 60 Motions in an attempt to set aside the Decree. Judge Faust, denied Baggett's 
first Motion. See R. 1502-06. Judge Faust made clear findings in his Minute Entry that 
Baggett had failed to show excusable neglect in filing a timely objection to the Decree. 
See Id. No appeal was taken. 
On July 10, 2008 Baggett filed another motion entitled Motion for Rule 60 Relief 
from Judgment or Order based upon Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), 60(b)(5), and 60(b)(6). 
See R. 1510 - 1686. Baggett asserted that either Robinson's misconduct or clerical error 
resulted in the entry of a final Order that does not conform to the Trial Court's 
substantive Rulings. See R. 1684-1686. 
At the hearing of October 23, 2008, Judge Faust did not make a Ruling either 
denying or granting Baggett's Rule 60 Motion for Relief but requested that the parties 
negotiate. 
On January 25, 2010, Baggett submitted his second Rule 60 Motion for decision to 
Court. See R. 1911-1913. On February 4, 2010, Judge Paul G Maughan denied 
Respondent's second Motion. SeeR. 1914-1917. The claim that Judge Faust "reopened" 
the final judgment is misplaced. When the transcript of the entire October 23, 2008 
hearing is taken in context it is clear that Judge Faust did not enter a Ruling regarding 
Respondent's second Rule 60(b) Motion and did not "reopen" the Decree. See R. 1923. 
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Therefore, when Respondent submitted his Notice to Submit for Decision to the 
Court, Judge Maughan correctly reviewed the Motion for Rule 60 Relief, on procedural 
and substantive grounds. SeeR. 1911-1913. Judge Maughan determined that Baggett 
had not met his burden stating that "[ajside from his arguments regarding the form of the 
Amended Decree, [Baggett] is essentially mounting a challenge to the legal merits of 
certain of Judge Roth's opinions. Yet this is precisely the type of perceived legal error 
which [Baggett] should have raised through a timely appeal. Rule 60(b) is simply not the 
appropriate vehicle for the Respondent to now present his legal challenges to Judge 
Roth's Rulings and is not a substitute for appeal." See R 1914-17. Judge Maughan 
specifically stated that from a substantive standpoint "the Court is not persuaded by 
[Baggett's] argument that the amended Decree does not accurately reflect Judge Roth's 
extensive rulings." See Id. Clearly, Judge Maughan's Ruling did "end the controversy 
between the parties litigant." See Bradbury vs. Valencia, 2000 UT. 50, % 9, 5 specific 3d 
649. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
RAGGETT'S SECOND MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a Trial Court to set aside a 
judgment "in the furtherings of justice [to] relieve a party.. .from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for.. .(3) fraud..., misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party;.. .or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). As Baggett stated in his Appellate Brief, a Trial Court is granted 
discretion to decide a Rule 60(b) Motion "based on sound legal principals in light of all 
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relevant circumstances." Laub vs. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P. 2d 1304, 1306 
(Utah 1982). Baggett correctly asserts that the primary legal principle involves "a 
balancing between the competing concerns that final judgments should not be lightly 
disturbed and that an unjust judgment should not be allowed to stand." Id. 
Judge Maughan5s Ruling denying Baggett's second 60(b) Motion demonstrates 
that the Court considered all the relevant circumstances, as well as the facts, and balanced 
the above stated legal principals. Baggett notes that Judge Maughan ruled on his Rule 
60(b) Motion without a hearing and that this was Judge Maughan's first involvement in 
the nearly seven (7) years of litigation. However, Judge Maughan was not the first to rule 
on one of Baggett's Rule 60 motions without a hearing. Both Judge Faust and Judge 
Maughan ruled on Baggett's motions without a hearing but chose to rely on the detailed 
briefs. The Rules do not require a hearing. The fact that the February 4, 2010 Ruling by 
Judge Maughan was his first involvement in this case does not rise to an abuse of 
discretion. In fact, six (6) different judges have been assigned to this case during the past 
seven (7) years and three (3) have made post-trial Rulings. 
Judge Maughan denied Baggett's Rule 60(b) Motion "on both procedural and 
substantive grounds." See R. 1916. Judge Maughan denied Baggett's Rule 60(b) Motion 
on substantive grounds, stating that he "[w]as not persuaded by [Baggett's] argument that 
the Decree does not accurately reflect Judge Roth's extensive Rulings." See R. 1915. 
Judge Maughan noted that he believed "this conclusion comports with Judge Faust's 
Ruling which similarly found a lack of legal or factual support for [Baggett's] initial Rule 
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60(b) Motion." R. 1915 n 1 (original)(emphasis added). Both Judge Faust and Judge 
Maughan found that the record supported Robinson's Decree. 
In Baggett5s Motion for Rule 59(e) or 60 Relief, he alleged an "irregularity" in the 
Decree that "does not conform to the Stipulation of the parties and the Ruling of the 
Court as expressed on July 11, 2007." R. 1377. Baggett goes on stating "[jjustice will be 
furthered by granting [Baggett's] motion for relief from this judgment which does not 
accurately represent the agreement which the parties made on the record in this Court." 
R. 1380. In the first Motion, Baggett alleged accident or surprise as his basis for 
requesting a new trial under Rule 59 and irregularity. He relied upon Rule 60(b) alleging 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Judge 
Faust, in his ruling, determined that Baggett could not rely on surprise or mistake as he 
had received notice by April 4, 2008 that the proposed Decree had been submitted to the 
Court. Judge Faust further found that Baggett had no reasonable excuse for not taking 
action and had effectively waived any right he had to complain or otherwise object to the 
"Amended Decree or its entry in the proposed form." See R. 1504. Judge Faust further 
found from the record and argument that "there [was] no legal or factual grounds to grant 
[Baggett's] requested relief." Id. 
The second Motion for Rule 60 (b) Relief, which was before Judge Maughan, 
requested the same relief that was set forth in the Motion for Rule 59(e) or 60 Relief, 
which was before Judge Faust. In the Rule 60(b) Motion, Baggett requests relief "from 
the Court's Order of April 11, 2008 finalizing the parties' divorce in this case in so far as 
the Order prepared by [Robinson] does not comply with the Court's substantive Rulings 
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and its original Memorandum Decision of January 2006 nor its bench Rulings and the 
parties' agreements at the hearing on [Baggett's] objections to the proposed Orders in 
July 2007." See R. 1511. Judge Maughan found, as did Judge Faust, that the Decree 
entered by the Court on April 11, 2008 accurately reflected Judge Roth's Rulings : "[t]he 
Court is not persuaded by [Baggett's] argument that the Amended Decree does not 
accurately reflect Judge Roth's extensive Rulings." See R. 1915. Judge Maughan's 
finding that the Decree was an accurate representation of Judge Roth's substantive 
Rulings resolved any issue of misrepresentations or clerical errors. 
Judge Maughan also determined that Baggett's Rule 60(b) Motion was 
procedurally barred because he considered it to be "effectively a renewal by [Baggett] of 
his prior [Rule 59 and 60] Motion." See R. 1371-73:Utah R. Civ. P.60(b)l. Judge 
Maughan correctly found that Baggett "is essentially mounting a challenge to the legal 
merits of certain of Judge Roth's opinions" by attacking the "form of the Amended 
Decree". See R. 1915. Judge Maughan then finds that "this is precisely the type of 
perceived legal error which the Respondent should have raised through a timely appeal" 
and that Rule 60(b) "is simply not the appropriate vehicle for [Baggett] to now present 
his legal challenges to Judge Roth's Rulings and is not a substitute for appeal." See R. 
1915-16. 
The Appellate Court "will not reverse a district Court's denial of a Rule 60(b) 
Motion unless the Court has abused its discretion." Katz v Pierce, 732 P. 2d 92, 93 (Utah 
1986). In Jones, the Court found that "[a] district court abuses its discretion only when 
its decision was against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable 
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as to shock one's sense of justice.. .[or] resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v 
Lavton/Okland, 2009 Ut 39, 214 P. 3d 859. The record supports Judge Maughan's 
Ruling that the Decree accurately reflects the Trial Court's substantive Rulings. Judge 
Maughan's Ruling follows "the logic of the circumstance". Judge Maughan was not 
exercising any bias, prejudice, or malice in denying Baggett's Rule 60(b) Motion. This 
Court should uphold the Trial Court's denial of Baggett's Motion for Rule 60 Relief from 
Judgment or Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Baggett failed to appeal the Divorce Decree. Baggett did not appeal the denial of 
his first Rule 60, U.R.C.P. Motion. He has now appealed the denial of his second Rule 
60 Motion. The Court should either deem this case ripe for appeal as to the denial of the 
second Rule 60(b) Motion or dismiss the appeal outright with the admonishment that 
there should be no further proceedings or appeal of the Decree or the Court's Order 
denying the post-Decree motions. If the Court entertains Baggett's appeal the appeal 
should be denied. Two District Judges have ruled that the Decree substantively reflects 
the Trial Judge's decision. In addition to Ruling on the factual and substantive nature of 
Baggett's objection, the two Judges have Ruled procedurally and equitably that Baggett's 
two Rule 60(b) Motions are not well taken. As to the singular substantive objection that 
Baggett now asserts his appeal is in error. That issue is the commencement date and 
duration of alimony. A review of the record demonstrates that the alimony was to 
commence upon the entry of the Decree. Mr. Baggett was to receive a twelve (12) month 
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"credit" against the term of alimony, 114 months, the duration of the marriage. The 
Decree correctly reflects this Ruling. 
The Appellee should be awarded her fees on appeal. 
DATED this j £ day ofD^£Mn\pl^ ,2010 
FREDRICK N.GREEN 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Utah R. App- P. Rule 3 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken 
(a) Filing appealfrom final orders and judgments. -- An appeal may be taken from a 
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all 
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by tiling a notice of 
appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an 
appellant to talce any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect 
the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. — If two or more parties are entitled to appeal 
from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they 
may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing 
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a 
single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court 
upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of tlie parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. — The party taking the appeal shall be known as tlie 
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall 
not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the 
appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the 
original application shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the 
respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal — The notice of appeal shall specify the party or 
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed 
from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the 
court to which tlie appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. — The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the 
filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of 
record of each party to the judgment or order; oi% if the party is not represented by 
counsel, then on tlie party at tlie party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such 
service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the 
certificate of service shall designate the name of the party represented by that counsel 
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(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. - At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or 
cross appeal in a civil case, the party talcing the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial 
court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall accept a notice of 
appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee 
within a reasonable time may result in dismissal. 
(g) Docketing of appeal — Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the 
trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the 
date of its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid 
and whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. 
An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the 
appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, 
such name shall be added to the title. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order 
(a) Clerical mistakes. — Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the 
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
~- On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon wliich it is based has been reversed or otlierwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken, A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
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the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
HISTORY: Amended effective April 1, 1998 
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. - The 1998 amendment elimmates as grounds for a 
motion the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action." This basis for a motion is not found in the federal rule. 
The committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in conflict with rules 
permitting service by means other than personal service. 
Utah Code Ann- § 30-3-5 (2010) 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children -
- Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — 
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court sliall include 
the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent cliildren including responsibility for health 
insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring 
the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent cliildren; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and 
which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 30-3-5A which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is 
covered by both parents1 health, hospital, or dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the pa3'ment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
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(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties1 
separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income vvithholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of 
the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the 
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the 
noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by Hie 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders 
for die custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, 
and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children bom to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by 
modification. 
(5) (a) Tn determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of die immediate family, the court shall consider the 
best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, 
the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered 
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter, 
(6) Tf a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable 
attorneys1 fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that 
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a 
visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a 
visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may 
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred 
by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-
ordered visitation or parent-time. 
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(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the 
payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's sldll by paying for education received by the payor spouse or alio whig the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage, 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a), 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in 
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In 
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the 
marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change 
in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall 
be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. 
If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property and awarding alimony, 
(0 In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 
children have been conceived or bom during the marriage, the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new 
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce, 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address 
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
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(iit) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor 
may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent ppouse's financial ability to share 
living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of ajSubsequent spouse if the court finds 
that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration Conger than the number of years that 
the marriage existed unless, at any lime prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be 
void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a 
party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the parly paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating 
with another person. 
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Addendum B 
FILED DiSTRICT C9UR7 
Third JudwJ District 
FEB - 4 2010 
OONTY 
s y m m ^^^„ I J _ 
Deputy Ctmk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY L. ROBINSON, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Petitioner, : CASE NO. 034901865 
vs. : 
ALEXANDER EARL BAGGETT, : 
Respondent. : 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with the 
respondent's Request to Submit for decision his Motion for Rule 60 Relief 
from Judgment or Order. The respondent has requested oral argument on 
this Motion. The Court declines to schedule this matter for hearing and 
will instead rule on the Motion based on the parties' written submissions 
as stated herein. 
As procedural background, the Court notes that the present Motion 
is effectively a renewal by the respondent of his prior Motion seeking 
relief under Rule 60(b), which Judge Faust, who was previously assigned 
to this matter, denied in a Minute Entry decision, dated June 27, 2008. 
In that Motion, the respondent argued that he intended to file an 
Objection to the petitioner's proposed Amended Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce ("Amended Decree"), but 
due to his counsel's mistake or excusable neglect, failed to do so. The 
Court denied the respondent's Motion, concluding that the failure to 
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timely object was AXinexcusable." The respondent now tries to take a 
different tack, arguing that his current Motion is based not on excusable 
neglect, but rather that the Amended Decree did not accurately reflect 
the Court's (through Judge Roth) substantive rulings and, in fact, 
contains certain provisions that are "violations of the law." 
In her Response, the petitioner correctly notes that there is 
nothing in the respondent's present Motion which could not have been 
raised in his initial Motion for Rule 60(b) relief. The respondent's 
prepared timeline demonstrates that he had ample opportunity to object 
to the form of the Amended Decree. However, having failed to timely file 
an Objection, the respondent cannot circumvent that process by instead 
seeking relief under the auspices of Rule 60(b). 
Further, from a more substantive standpoint, the Court is not 
persuaded by the respondent's argument that the Amended Decree does not 
accurately reflect Judge Roth's extensive rulings.1 Aside from his 
arguments regarding the form of the Amended Decree, the respondent is 
essentially mounting a challenge to the legal merits of certain of Judge 
Roth's opinions. Yet, this is precisely the type of perceived legal 
error which the respondent should have raised through a timely appeal. 
Rule 60(b) is simply not the appropriate vehicle for the respondent to 
now present his legal challenges to Judge Roth's rulings and is not a 
1
 The Court notes that this conclusion comports with Judge Faust's Minute Entry which 
similarly found a lack of legal or factual support for the respondent's initial Rule 60(b) Motion. 
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substitute for appeal. Accordingly, the Court denies the respondent's 
Motion on both procedural and substantive grounds. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this f _day of February,/2olo 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this v day of February, 
2010: 
Frederick N. Green 
Attorney for Petitioner 
7390 S. Creek Road, Suite 104 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Michael K. Mohrman 
Attorney for Respondent 
175 S. Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Addendum C 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN [4094] 
MOHRMAN PRANNO & SCHOFIELD PC 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
175 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 746-2268 
Fax No.: (801) 746-2411 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY L. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALEXANDER EARL BAGGETT, 
Respondent. 
MOTION FOR RULE 59(e) OR RULE 
60(b) RELIEF 
Civil No. 034901865 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
COMES NOW the respondent, Alex Baggett, by and through his counsel of 
record, Michael K. Mohrman of and for the law firm of Mohrman Pranno & Schofield PC, and 
moves for relief pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent's initial 
failure to object to the supplemental decree submitted by petitioner was a result of the irregularity 
in these proceedings (Rule 59(a)(1)) or, alternatively, of accident and surprise (Rule 59(a)(3)). 
In the alternative, the respondent moves for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). "On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in furtherance of justice relieve a 
party...from a final judgment, order or proceeding for...mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 60(b). 
It is in the interests of justice to grant respondent's motion. The decree filed does not 
accurately reflect the stipulation made on the record in the July 11, 2007 hearing before this 
Court, nor does it reflect this Court's ruling at that hearing. Further, Respondent's failure to 
object to the decree was the product of excusable neglect. 
Respondent respectfully requests a hearing on this matter. 
DATED THIS ^ - ° day of April, 2008. 
Mohrman Pranno & Schofield PC 
V 
Michael K. Mohrman 
Attorney for Respondent 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct cop> ol the foregomg instrument 
was mailed, tirst-class, postage prepaid, and as otherwise indicated below, on this /^fy^day of 
April, 2006, to the following: 
Frederick N. Green, Esq 
7390 South Creek Road, Suite ID 
Sandv, Utah 84093 
(\) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) I land Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
i i Electronic Facsimile 
S:\Cases\B009.Baggett, Alex\Pieadings\Motion Rule 59 60.wpd 
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Addendum D 
Michael K. Mohrman [4094] 
Mohrman Pranno & Schofield PC 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
175 S. Main St., Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 746-2268 
Fax No.: (801) 746-2411 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY L. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
V«Q 
V 3 , 
ALEXANDER EARL BAGGETT, 
Respondent. 
MOTION FOR RULE 60 RELIEF FROM 
! JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
(Hearing Requested) 
{ Civil No. 034901865 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
Comes now the respondent, Alexander Earl Baggett, by and through his counsel of 
record,, Michac 1 I C I\ "lol n n tat i of ai id foi the lav • I it m of Mohi mai 1 I *i ai H :to & Scliofield PC, ai id 
moves for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "On motion and 
upon such terms as aic jtisl ihc tour* n\^> »|« I'M iberame <>| justhv relieve a parh 'mm a. final 
judgment, order or proceeding" for the following reasons: 
a. "fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party," Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); 
b. "the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
i ipoi i i •'" .'hicl i it is be ised has beer 11 evei sed or oil ici wise vacated, or it is nc longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. » ;tn ^ : P. 
60(b)(5); and 
c. "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b)(6) 
The respondent particularly requests relief with respect h* duration of alimony, 
satisfaction or partial .uii:H;^  <:- n-. * * luii/men- -IU naracterization of th p<ee— - Mfe 
insurance, assumption of the credit card liability, and an offset against the respondent's share of 
equity in the marital home to satisfy any remaining judgments and the attorney's fee award, I he 
respondent also 'emie-;!" er^-ei? relief IW -MWC the decree entered elncs IH-T .leeur.it.-ly reflect the 
Memorandum Decision or the parties' agreements made on the record in the post-decision 
hearing of Ji if ' 11, 2007 before Ji idge Stephen ,R otl I, i u )i does it i eflect Judge R otl fs i tiling at 
that hearing. 
This motion is supported by an accompanying memorandum filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
/ & 
DATED THIS /0 -^day of July, 2008. 
Michael K. Monrman 
Attorney for Respondent 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, and as otherwise indicated below, on this fO day of 
July, 2008, to the following: 
Frederick N. Green, Esq. 
7390 South Creek Road, Suite 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
04 
{/) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Electronic Facsimile 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: Okay. We're here in Robinson 
4 versus Baggett, it's case number 034901865, on 
5 objections to proposed order. 
6 Would you make your appearances? 
7 MR. GREEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 
8 Rick Green appearing for the petitioner, who is 
9 present. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 MR. MOHRMAN: Michael Mohrman, Your Honor, 
12 on behalf of the respondent, Alex Baggett. 
13 And I have with me today a new associate 
14 in my office who's studying for the bar, Tracy 
15 Schofield, and I brought her alone for the ride, Your 
16 Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Well, we've all been through 
18 the bar, it would seem, and I'd rather be on this 
19 side than that side. 
20 MR. MOHRMAN: Your Honor, I have a 
21 preliminary matter, if I may just briefly address the 
22 Court. 
23 THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 
24 MR. MOHRMAN: This has been bothering me 
25 for quite some time, and I feel like I need to bring 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 it to the Court's attention, and it has to do with 
2 what I consider to be an overzealous response on my 
3 reply -- on my part. 
4 Mr. Green submitted the documents to the 
5 Court so that we could get this hearing set, and 
6 included in those documents a letter that he fully 
7 intended to be humorous. And, in fact, as I thought 
8 about it and dealt with it over the last couple of 
9 months, I've -- and knowing Rick the way I know --
10 I'm sorry, Mr. Green -- the way I know him, I know it 
11 was intended to be that way. 
12 I wrote a harsh letter, and I think it was 
13 inappropriate, and I wanted to apologize to Mr. Green 
14 and tell him, frankly, how much I respect him as an 
15 attorney, and, frankly, I hope still as a friend. 
16 And I wanted the Court to know that. And I wanted 
17 the Court to know that from my perspective there is 
18 absolutely no ill will, and I think I overreacted. 
19 I just wanted the Court to know that. 
20 THE COURT: And that's noted for the 
21 record. 
22 MR. GREEN: And acknowledged, Your Honor. 
23 The matter is forgotten long ago by me, along with 
24 many other things, and the respect is mutual. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I know both of you. And I 
know and respect both of you, so I appreciate you 
putting that on the record, and it's noted. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
So let's go ahead. It seems to me it 
might be appropriate to go through each one one by 
one. I'll try to make a decision on each of the 
objections as we go through rather than having you 
argue about the entire scope of them. 
So why don't we start through -- in the 
order that they've been -- been made. 
I've gone through and read what you've -
what you've said here, and I appreciate the -- what 
you've prepared for me in writing. It was very 
helpful. But let's go ahead and do this one by one. 
Mr. Mohrman, it's your objection, so why 
don't you go ahead and start? 
MR. MOHRMAN: If — if you may -- if I 
may, Your Honor, I need to find -- I have the 
supplemental findings. And if I may, I now am 
looking for the supplemental decree. So if you'd 
just give me one second, I'll pull it up. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
THE COURT: If what you need is the -- the 
objections to the decree were well -- the objections 
to the findings, so why don't we deal with the 
findings initially and perhaps rule on some of those 
to resolve the decree as well. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Your Honor, did you receive 
a courtesy copy of just my outline of arguments that 
I delivered yesterday? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Do you mind if I just 
approach the bench? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And Mr. Green, I believe, 
has a copy of this. 
MR. GREEN: I do, Your Honor. And I have 
no objection to the outline. In fact, it may even be 
helpful. It might expedite things somewhat. 
My objection, however, is going to go to 
further argument that was hand delivered -- well, 
faxed yesterday and hand delivered today in the form 
of two exhibits, Exhibit A and B, which go beyond 
summarizing what was of record, and goes on now to 
other matters that - - particularly in connection with 
Exhibit B. I've not been able to respond and 
probably won't be able to respond here today. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
1 THE COURT: Let's address them as they 
2 come up --
3 MR. GREEN: That would be fine. 
4 THE COURT: -- and I'll deal with the 
5 particular objections at that time. 
6 MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
7 If I may approach? 
8 THE COURT: You may. 
9 MR. MOHRMAN: And if you will bear with me 
10 one more moment, Your Honor, I will look at the --
11 First, Your Honor, with respect to child 
12 custody and support -- I mean, the physical custody 
13 and the legal custody, I believe that there is no 
14 objection with regard to those items, or to parent 
15 time. 
16 With respect to child support, Your Honor, 
17 I would like you to look at my -- the second page of 
18 the documents that I've just provided to you. And it 
19 says -- dated -- oh, I'm sorry, I've gotten ahead of 
20 myself here. I apologize. 
21 The child support, Your Honor, with 
22 respect to the amount, we do not object to. I will 
23 get to another aspect --
24 MR. GREEN: Let me -- let me expedite 
25 things, Your Honor. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
We have reconsidered this matter. And 
several of the inclusions in the findings and decree 
were meant more for discussion points. 
The Court should know that we have met 
together several times and we have identified these 
ten discreet issues. Our hope that we could see eye 
to eye on some of things and give and take, I think 
we've gone as far as we can. 
The petitioner will adopt the proposal 
that the child support be paid on the 5th and 
the 20th per the statute, and delete the reference to 
the ten percent trigger for modification. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
And -- and Mr. Green --
THE COURT: And that seems a fair 
resolution. 
MR. GREEN: I agree. 
MR. MOHRMAN: I appreciate that very much. 
And, Mr. Green, if you would like, perhaps 
the easiest way to go through this would be just to 
go through -- even though they're not in order, Your 
Honor, we'll go through the issues as I've identified 
them in my -- in my little discussion. And to the 
extent that there's any mistakes in here, I certainly 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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would expect Mr. Green to jump up and indicate if 
I've misstated any of the positions. 
In memorandum decision, Your Honor, you 
made a finding with respect to the recovery for past 
wages from the class action lawsuit. 
The proposed order, as per the 
petitioner's form -- which, by the way, Your Honor, 
you could look on page 19 of the Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and it would 
be paragraph 4(b), subsection 5 -- the petitioner 
recommends the following language: That the 
respondent shall provide a release for petitioner 
allowing Steve Maylows (ph) and the FSC attorneys to 
provide information to petitioner regarding status of 
the litigation and respondent's status regarding 
payment of attorney's fees in the litigation. 
Simply put, Your Honor, our objection is 
that you made no recommendation or finding with 
respect to that and that that's an additional request 
on the part of the petitioner. 
I certainly understand in part where the 
petitioner is going, but it would be my position and 
my client's position, after really quite a bit of 
discussion, that this really would be in the nature 




1 as opposed to making the change now. 
2 Our position is that the Court did not 
3 make any recommendation with respect to that and this 
4 is superfluous and really, frankly, not needed. 
5 THE COURT: Yeah. And let me tell you one 
6 thing. At the end of my conclusion I asked for --
7 that the petitioner prepare Findings of Fact and 
8 Conclusions that would put into effect my rulings and 
9 anything that would flow from there. 
10 It seems to me that what you're proposing 
11 here, that is, the language that talks about the 
12 uncertainty of recovery is certainly appropriate. It 
13 comes out -- essentially out of my decision. I don't 
14 have a problem with that going in there. I suspect 
15 that fir. Green does not either. 
16 I am a little concerned, because the issue 
17 that seems to have been raised here is that while 
18 there's an uncertain value, the parties seem to think 
19 that it may have some value that they're investing a 
20 certain amount in it with some anticipation of 
21 recovery. And it seems to me that there's a problem 
22 here if for some reason the respondent, who has 
23 pretty much full control over this because he's the 
24 party and is paying the fees, stops paying the fees 
25 or opts out for some reason and the petitioner 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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doesn't have any way to know that. 
This is, that asset, for whatever it's 
worth, may disappear because of respondent's inaction 
or action without her having any ability to know 
that. And I -- I don't think in this -- because of 
the conflict level here, that I certainly wouldn't 
want to depend on the parties' goodwill to 
communicate with each other to make sure that 
something like that doesn't happen. 
So what's the objection to having some 
alternative to direct - -
MR. MOHRMAN: Frankly, Your Honor, none, 
except to the extent that it may -- that there are 
only two concerns that I have. And one is that 
somehow it may increase the expense to the parties, 
which I want -- I want to have happen -- not happen. 
And the second is, Your Honor, I don't want -- I 
don't want Mr. Maylows or anyone else involved with 
the FSC litigation to view this as some sort of an 
impediment. 
Frankly, I think, Your Honor, the decree 
does contemplate some sort of specific information to 
which the petitioner should be entitled. 
I'm uncomfortable about the direct 




THE COURT: If we had an alternative 
proposal that would accomplish --
MR. MOHRMAN: I have a compromise 
proposal --
THE COURT: What is it? 
MR. MOHRMAN: -- and that is that she 
be -- that the Court order that authorization be 
given to the petitioner to communicate directly with 
the FSC. But to the extent that that increases in 
any way the expense to the FSC attorneys, that she 
bear that additional cost. 
But I, frankly, don't think there will be 
one. I'm telling you straight that this is out of an 
abundance of caution on my part and being concerned 
for my client's privacy in the FSC litigation. The 
Court's already ordered that the petitioner's 
entitled to 30 percent of recovery. 
So I just want to be sure that there's no 
additional expense to my client. If we can do that, 
I'm happy . 
THE COURT: Mr. Green? 
MR. GREEN: My proposal would be that, 
being as we all agree she has a vested interest in 
that litigation, in everything but name, that 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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instructions be given to counsel for the respondent 
in that litigation to simply add her name on the 
mailing list. 
This is a class action. There's I don't 
know how many hundreds of --
MR. MOHRMAN: I'll stipulate to that, Your 
Honor. That --
MR. GREEN: Just add her to the list, 
she'll get everything. 
And furthermore, provide that evidence be 
given on a timely periodic basis, say, monthly, that 
the respondent has paid the fee. 
THE COURT: And it's from the respondent. 
MR. GREEN: Correct. 
THE COURT: Is that --
MR. MOHRMAN: We'll absolutely stipulate 
to that, Your Honor, and the record can reflect that. 
THE COURT: Then that takes care of that 
issue. 
MR. GREEN: Very well. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And I believe we've handled 
issue number two, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Life insurance, Your Honor, 
there were absolutely no findings with respect to 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 this, and we are really quite strenuous in our 
2 obj ecti on. 
3 There were a number of statements 
4 regarding to how much life insurance should be added 
5 to the decree and for what reason, some of which were 
6 not argued at the trial, some of which were more 
7 directly. 
8 But in any event, the Court made no 
9 finding or provision with respect to life insurance. 
10 I, frankly, believe that this is an inappropriate 
11 additional item and request that it be stricken from 
12 the proposed supplemental decree of divorce. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
14 MR. GREEN: Your Honor, it is one of 
15 those -- I've scratched the only item that came up 
16 that was presented and argued. It was before the 
17 Court. It is one of those things that in the morass 
18 of many issues sometimes does not bubble to the top 
19 and get a decision. 
20 I think it is before Your Honor -- and if 
21 the Court did indeed wish that the request for life 
22 insurance be denied, then perhaps that would be the 
23 order. 
24 THE COURT: Was it raised? 
25 MR. GREEN: Yes. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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THE COURT: Okay. I did indicate at the 
end of my --
MR. GREEN: Correct. 
THE COURT: — findings that there may 
have been things that I missed. 
MR. GREEN: That's right. And that's 
typical in any case of this complexity. 
THE COURT: Well, if it's -- if it was 
raised and I didn't resolve it, then it's subject to 
resolution still at this point based on --
MR. GREEN: Correct. 
THE COURT: -- memorandum decision 
indicating that I would take it into account. 
So I don't know that I recall the 
arguments or the evidence presented on that issue. 
Do you want me to resolve it now? 
MR. GREEN: May I make a suggestion, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. GREEN: In light of the fact that this 
is still ripe for decision, I would suggest that that 
would be a door open far enough for us to discuss it. 
And if not, submit it to Your Honor based upon very 
minimal briefing on that discreet issue, and maybe 




will be any. 
I'm con--
THE COURT: Is that suitable, Mr. Mohrman? 
MR. MOHRMAN: I concur completely. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's do that then 
and - -
MR. MOHRMAN: We're not - - we weren't that 
far off at our last meeting, and so I think that's 
one that we could discuss. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I think there 
should be some life insurance set to be in place or 
guarantee some of these payments that are ongoing. 
And you all are going to know better what's 
reasonable and what's doable in that sense. And I 
would also (inaudible). 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The next issue is respondent's retirement 
account. And just for your ease, Your Honor, if you 
look to pages 19 through 21 of the Supplemental 
Findings and Conclusions of Law, and it's 
paragraph iv(b) -- small four -- IV -- small Roman 
numeral four, B through C -- the Court clearly took 
into consideration the pre-marriage IRA value of the 
respondent being awarded to him. 
The Court went on to say that 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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post-separation the $11,860 loan to respondent should 
be considered as part of the division per this order 
of the retirement account. 
And what I am concerned about, Your Honor, 
here is pretty straightforward. I believe that two 
things are potentially occurring: One, that there 
may be a double counting of the 11,860 IRA loan 
amount. 
And here's the point: The $11,860 IRA 
loan amount is carried as an asset of the account. 
THE COURT: Is it a loan? 
MR. MOHRMAN: It was a loan to him. 
THE COURT: Not a straight withdrawal? 
MR. MOHRMAN: No, not a straight 
withdrawal. It was a loan --
THE COURT: Has that been -- can that be 
verified or has it been verified - -
MR. MOHRMAN: Well, with respect, Your 
Honor, it doesn't really matter, because what she is 
going -- it's going to be carried as an asset and 
she's going to be awarded one half of it out of the 
remaining assets in the account anyway. That's --
that's my point. She'll get the full amount. 
She's entitled to basically half - - or, 




1 as an asset. 
2 And letfs pretend that there's $100,000 in 
3 the account that should have been 111. She will get 
4 half of 111,000, but it will just be taken out of the 
5 remaining 100. That's all that has to happen. The 
6 QDROs handle that every time. 
7 It's carried as an asset as -- part of it, 
8 and so it should be divided. She's entitled to half 
9 of it. 
10 What I don't want to have happen is to 
11 divide it, and then do as she recommends in the 
12 second section for the sake of simplicity, and carry 
13 it as an offset against her claim to the home equity. 
14 And I think the Court made no ruling with respect to 
15 that. The Court simply directed that the $11,000 
16 loan should be taken into consideration. We're 
17 saying that it will totally be taken into 
18 consideration in the numbers and divided and she will 
19 get 50 percent of it. 
20 I can see a no more direct way to do it 
21 than that, and the accounting will provide for it. 
22 And, frankly, Your Honor, with my representation 
23 here, if that didn't happen I'd be the one on the 
24 hook on that. So I think that there's more than 
25 enough assurance on that $11,000. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Green? 
MR. GREEN: I am told by one who knows 
more and recalls better than I, my client, that 
the 11,860 loan, which was taken out of the IRA, was 
reflected as a reduction in that IRA balance in the 
evidence presented at trial. And so the number we 
were dealing with at trial, and which is now subject 
to division, already reflects the deduction of that 
amount. 
That amount was received by Mr. Baggett. 
It was received as cash, he spent it, it was not 
deferred, he doesn't have to wait. 
Mr. Baggett is correct, my client should 
not receive the totality of that, she should receive 
half. But that half should either be awarded to her 
as a present judgment, because he enjoyed the money, 
or at her option -- and in all likely, she will 
exercise that option -- as a deduction in credit 
against his home lien which is some $23,000. 
There is no other way to equalize the 
character of the money where he got it, didn't wait, 
used it. She doesn't have that same treatment if it 
is part of the IRA which must be deferred, and, not 
to mention, taxed. 




briefly, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MOHRMAN: First, Your Honor, I need to 
be careful, because I'm not sure that I recall all of 
the testimony that well from the trial. However, I 
want to be certain that we're not confusing the 
premarital IRA of 11,617.51, for which he was given 
credit, and this 11,860. 
Again, as I say, if the 11,860, regardless 
of what the evidence was at trial, is carried as an 
asset on that account, the order would reflect that 
the petitioner would be entitled to the amount of 
that account including that $11,860 asset divided by 
half as of the date the Court decides. To me, that 
is better. 
And, again, Your Honor, with respect to 
the equity that Mr. Green brings up, the Court 
already declined in its ruling to adopt that remedy 
when Mr. Baggett suggested that his equity in the 
house of $21,000 be offset against the pre -- the 
unpaid judgment that the Court entered of around 
$26,000. And so I don't think we should mix that up. 
I think all the Court should order is that 
that 11,860 IRA, it should be confirmed -- that loan 
should be confirmed to be part of the IRA and 
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divided 50/50 between the parties, and that solves 
the problem. 
MR. GREEN: I agree. We obviously need to 
find out if it was an asset. It's -- the difference 
is -- and this is part of the confusion -- it sounds 
like it's not an IRA at all. I believe it's a 
401(k). 
MR. MOHRMAN: 401(k). 
MR. GREEN: If it was an IRA, it's a 
simple matter of a balance on a statement. 
MR. MOHRMAN: He couldn't --
MR. GREEN: And so we would -- we would 
know that. That's the problem. 
And so I think the burden ought to be on 
the respondent to show whether it is included as an 
asset of the 401(k). If it is, it can be dealt with 
as a QDRO. If it was already reduced by that amount, 
then I would go back to my earlier argument. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And I --
MR. GREEN: We'll have to resolve that 
between us, obviously. 
THE COURT: Well, no, and I -- and I dealt 
with that in my decision, because I said that if it 
actually was withdrawn and reduced that it simply 




total to be divided would include that amount and 
that Ms. Robinson would -- would get her share free 
of that --
MR. GREEN: All right. 
THE COURT: -- obligation. 
So I think that -- that I dealt pretty 
directly with that, and I'll go with the decision 
that I made on thi s. 
MR. MOHRMAN: All right. 
THE COURT: It seems to me it would be 
helpful at this point to resolve whether it was a 
loan and be made as an asset or whether it simply is 
deducted. 
MR. MOHRMAN: It sounds to me like 
Mr. Green and I completely agree on this. 
I do want to make two points, Your Honor. 
I knew it was the 401(k), and I apologize for the 
confusion. He would not have been able to borrow 
against it if it was merely an IRA, and he did borrow 
against it. And the QDRO will -- we can make sure 
that Ms. Robinson is covered. 
And I will go one step further. I agree 
with Mr. Green that the burden is on the respondent 
there, and we'll make it --
THE COURT: Well, I -- I think I've 
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established an equitable decision to take care of 
that, so --
MR. GREEN: Very well. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The next item, Your Honor, is one of these 
difficulties that I'm almost -- I really don't know 
how to deal with this. My client is in -- this is 
issue five. It's -- if you look on page 17 --
MR. GREEN: May I -- may I interrupt? 
With all respect, I think there was 
another objection on the retirement issue, and that 
was as to the effective date for purposes of the 
QDRO. I don't know if we dealt with that, and maybe 
we'11 want to - -
MR. MOHRMAN: No, we didn't. 
MR. GREEN: -- before we move on. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Green. I 
appreciate it. 
Yes, Your Honor. The effective date for 
the Qualified Domestic Relations Order, in my view, 
actually ought to be the date of the parties' 
divorce. 
If the Court will recall, their divorce 
was bifurcated at the time of trial. And subsequent 
to that time, the Court entered its ruling in -- the 
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1 trial was in June, I believe, of 2005. In January 
2 of 2006 the Court entered its order. 
3 In any event, Your Honor, the 401(k), what 
4 Ms. Robinson is entitled to, ought not to post date 
5 the Court's ruling in January of 2006. 
6 Frankly, I believe that it is a windfall 
7 if she receives any additional amounts for his 
8 contributions, if any, between trial and the Court's 
9 ruling because the parties were, in fact, divorced. 
10 However, if the Court deems that the 
11 supplemental decree date should apply, as a 
12 compromise position, I would say that that would be 
13 the absolute outside the Court should go. 
14 Again, any other date -- any other date 
15 for the division of the 401(k) will result in a pure 
16 and utter windfall for the petitioner, to which, 
17 frankly, she is not entitled. 
18 She will get all of her interest on her 
19 share of any growth of the 401(k) or any of the other 
20 retirement accounts from the date that the Court 
21 makes the division final. 
22 I would strenuously suggest that the Court 
23 put that date as actually the date of the decree of 
24 divorce and no longer. However, if the Court deems 




THE COURT: Mr. Green? 
MR. GREEN: As to the date of the 
bifurcated divorce, that's an entirely arbitrary date 
that was intended to be without prejudice, as 
Mr. Baggett full-well knows. 
In fact, I'm very careful on those to 
include no prejudice language that reeds something 
like every other issue in this case will be resolved 
as though no decree were entered. And that's why I'm 
so particular about that language in bifurcated 
cases. 
THE COURT: And is that in the 
bifurcation --
MR. GREEN: I don't know for sure, but I'm 
sure it has no prejudice language at least. Whether 
it has as though no -- as though no decree were 
entered, I -- I don't know. I have not reviewed it 
for that in mind. 
Having said that, this is a bigger issue 
than just whether or not we're going to compromise 
with the January language or whether there's going to 
be a date of whenever this decree is actually signed. 
And I agree the signing of the actual 
decree is somewhat arbitrary and governed by facts 
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that are beyond everybody's control. 
But the bigger issue is, and it's issue 
number 10 in this case, is whether or not Mr. Baggett 
should get the advantage of the favorable treatment 
under the Court's order without performing the 
obligations of the Court's order. 
And the Court will find that it has not 
performed the obligations of the Court's order, 
specifically when it comes to the payment of the 
debt, which my client has continued to pay, 
some $48,000 worth, which she has continued to 
service, specifically his nonpayment of the 
arrearages which the Court found, nonpayment 
of 20,000 in attorney's fees which the Court deemed 
reasonable. And then he wants these advantages. 
This is one of those. 
Having said that, I'll submit it to Your 
Honor. 
It's a difficult issue. It might be 
different than the -- the number 10 issue, which is 
do we calculate his arrearages under the temporary 
order or under the ruling. It's a little different 
than that, but it's got some overlap with it. And my 
client's position is we do it when the decree --
supplemental decree that deals with this issue is 
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signed. 
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that 
there's - - there is several dates that might be 
perfect here, and all we've talked about is the 
bifurcated - - decree of divorce, date of trial, date 
of my ruling, and date of entry of the final order. 
The date of ruling and the date of entry 
of the final order tend to be somewhat arbitrary. 
That is, they're dictated by events and they're not 
directly related to the merits of the case. That's 
true somewhat about the trial date as well. 
I am concerned that -- that it appears to 
me that the respondent is trying to get the benefit 
of the ruling that I've made without having attempted 
to comply fully with it. That is, he sort of left 
the petitioner here with all the deficits that she 
had that I was trying to correct in the ruling and 
then he's trying to gain all the benefits of it. And 
that's of some concern to me. 
If he had gone ahead and paid the 
arrearages, had he paid the attorney's fees, if --
and made some good faith attempt to sort of equalize 
the situation, I'd be more sympathetic to -- to his 
request here that we choose an earlier date for that. 
But yet he's left her essentially with all the 
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arrearages and the burden of the continuing debt 
without having made any attempt, it appears to me, to 
do anything other than reduce his payments by what 
benefited him, which was a lower level of child 
support and alimony payments in sum. 
So I agree with Mr. Green that he appears 
to have been trying to have his cake and eat it too 
on this basis, and I simply don't think that that's 
appropri ate. 
There are -- we talked about faultness, 
and I made some attempts in this case not to dwell 
too much on that issue. But there's certainly -- in 
my ruling, there's a considerable discussion of 
issues that I thought merited some -- some 
fashionable discussion in order to support the ruling 
that I made. Those issues, that is, the respondent's 
somewhat immature dealings with his relationships and 
responsibilities of this process, seem to me to be 
compounded by the request that you're now making. 
And I'm going to -- for that reason, and 
for reasons I've already stated at length, I believe 
that the respondent is -- petitioner should not be 
further burdened and that the respondent should not 
further benefit from what has been actions of his 
that in an equitable context are very negative, that 
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do involve some fault on his part that have increased 
the amount of money that is a monthly and full burden 
to petitioner. And therefore, I'm finding that the 
divisions of my decision will take effect as of the 
date the supplemental decree was signed. 
Now, I will except that with regards to 
the accumulation rights to the retirement problem. I 
think that's a separate issue here. And for that 
reason, I'm going to find that the date of my ruling 
would be the time that the division of assets as to 
the retirement amounts should be done. 
And in fact -- let me take a look. 
It will be the date that I found -- made 
the distribution on petitioner's accounts. And it 
was the valuation that was given at trial. That 
seems fair. I've done that for the petitioner in 
terms of not requiring her to share additional 
amounts of money that's been accumulated in that as 
we went forward. And it seems to me that I've 
established a date that's appropriate for the 
division of retirement accounts that it needs -- on 
whatever date I used for the division for accounts. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Frankly, Your Honor, that's 






























I do want to address some of the substance 
of other comments that you've made later when we get 
to them in point in particular. But thank you for 
that ruling. 




Is that clear, Mr. Green? 
I believe so, Your Honor. 
Okay. It looked to me that it 
was 2(d) (i) is the place where I make the division of 
petitioner's account, and I think it was based on the 
evidence that was entered at trial, which was time of 
trial. 
MR. GREEN: I'm sure. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: So the -- so as I understand 
it, the retirement accounts will be valued as of that 
time and she will -- she will, of course, receive all 
interest thereon of her portion of --
THE COURT: That's accumulated on that 
porti on 
MR. MOHRMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 




MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Now, with respect to the personal 
property, Mr. Baggett, as we've -- I've indicated, is 
a pilot. In fact, I spoke with him this morning and 
yesterday. Yesterday morning I spoke with him, he 
was in Hong Kong. I do not know where he was today, 
headed to Korea, I believe. 
THE COURT: This is sort of the general 
personal property --
MR. MOHRMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- that's the car. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And I do not know if the 
petitioner still has the 1987 Nissan 4Runner. And, 
frankly, I do not believe that neither -- that my 
client believes that that is an issue. And if she 
has disposed of it, fine. If she hasn't, she can go 
ahead and do that. But with respect to his personal 
property --
THE COURT: Has he abandoned the 4Runner 
then? 
MR. MOHRMAN: Yes. There's no way for him 
to get it or to do anything with it, Your Honor. It 
probably has little or no value. He is in the 
Philippines where his base of operation is. It's 
just really not something that we should fight over. 
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1 With respect to the personal property, 
2 however, he advises me that he will be in the states 
3 between -- sometime between the middle of September 
4 and the end of October and will be able to pick up 
5 his personal property and the other personal items 
6 that were listed by October 31st. 
7 THE COURT: How much bulk is there in that 
8 personal property? 
9 MR. MOHRMAN: I -- Your Honor, that I do 
10 not know, but I understood it's not a lot. 
11 MS. ROBINSON: Well, I guess, Your Honor, 
12 that would depend on what he deems to be half. I 
13 mean, I have, like, water skis --
14 MR. GREEN: I think we can assume it's a 
15 truckload if it's half of what's there. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 Any problem with setting up a date -- an 
18 abandonment date of, let's say, November 15th? 
19 MR. GREEN: I think -- all we want is a 
20 date drop-dead certain. So if November 15 is good 
21 enough, then that will be fine. I understood he was 
22 here by the end of October, so that gives him a 
23 two-week - -
24 THE COURT: That seems t o me t o g i v e a 
25 g race p e r i o d t h a t t h a t ough t t o be done f o r no t much 
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further inconvenience. I realize when I make those 
judgments that I don't have (inaudible). 
MR. GREEN: Fair enough. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go ahead. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The next issue has to do with the issue of 
alimony and what the amount is. This is the more 
difficult position, I think, for all of us involved. 
But there are two issues regarding the alimony 
that -- with which we take exception. 
First, Your Honor, you've already eluded 
to one issue, and I'm just going to briefly touch on 
it, which has to do with the length of time that 
alimony should last. And you basically said in your 
ruling, if I read it correctly, that if he pays the 
arrearages within 45 days of the decision then you'll 
give him two years of credit, but if he doesn't 
you'll give him one year of credit. That's what I 
understand. 
Even with that language, what the 
petitioner wants in her findings is that you don't 
give any credit. And I, frankly, believe that that 
would be inappropriate. And I believe that the --
the amount of alimony should measure from the time 
period the Court provided, which would be 2004, at 
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114 months . 
MR. GREEN: We agree to 102 months. And I 
thought that the corrections I made in one of my 
iterations reflected that. So 102 months --
THE COURT: And you were asking for 102 
months. I think they've agreed to that. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Okay. 
MR. GREEN: Yes. 
MR. MOHRMAN: That's fine, Your Honor. 
Then with respect to the amount of 
alimony, Your Honor, I believe that the Court 
ordered $1882 per month in support and asked the 
parties to take into consideration the tax effects of 
that to determine what amount of alimony she would 
need to receive in order to essentially net $1882 per 
month. 
You clearly said in your memorandum 
decision that you hadn't taken the tax 
considerations -- you hadn't calculated that out, and 
asked us to do so. 
This is something where I think there is 
some disagreement between the parties. But suffice 
it to say, that based upon her imputed income of 
$35,000 a month and her tax status, we believe that 
she would clearly only need an additional $282 per 
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month in alimony to meet the $1882 net threshold. 
The -- at $35,000 a year in imputed 
income, Your Honor, the tax on that would be just --
the truncated version would be $900 a year, because 
she would get the two exemptions of 6600, her 
itemized deductions estimated at around $12,000 with 
her house payment and other items. The taxable 
income would be 16,400. She would get a head of 
household deduction and a child tax credit of a 
thousand dollars and a head of household amount 
of $1900, which would leave her with only $900 in 
tax . 
If you add to that alimony of 22,584, that 
would yield an after-tax obligation on the -- or the 
whole amount of $3,387 -- 3,387 on the alimony. 
So our position is that $282 per month is 
the amount. 
Now, Mr. Green has objected to Exhibit A, 
I believe. That is -- and he constitutes that as our 
argument. But in terms of trying to figure this out, 
Your Honor, that's how we arrived at these numbers, 
and we believe they're correct. 
The -- of course, this doesn't take into 




I -- our belief is, Your Honor, that 
really, not putting too fine a point on it, alimony 
of $2,449 per month is, frankly, excessive, given the 
income that she earns, or is imputed to have earned 
or can earn, and what she really can earn. $282 per 
month in additional amount over the 1882 we believe 
is adequate for the final order. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Green? 
MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
First of all, we'd all agree on the 
principle that the Court was talking in terms of net 
numbers when it awarded the alimony of some $1882 per 
month and gave instructions to figure out what the 
gross number needs to be so that my client will net 
that. 
The problems I have with Exhibit A, in 
addition to surprise, are that I don't see any 
foundation for these numbers, I don't know who 
prepared them, I don't know what qualifications they 
had, but I do know some of the assumptions which are 
probably incorrect. 
For instance, one of the assumptions is 
the itemized deductions of $12,000. I don't know how 
that number was arrived at. 
I will tell you that the calculations 
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performed by Roy Rasmussen, CPA, which is Exhibit C 
to the respondent's, I think, memorandum in 
opposition, or something like, to that to the 
objection, did assume that my client would have at 
least the statutory minimum exemptions which the IRA 
permi ts. 
Now, sometimes that's too small if people 
make sizable charitable donations, but I think that 
there will be some failure of proof on that point, 
and certainly no evidence to support the itemized 
deduction assumption or the tax credit of a thousand 
dollars. 
THE COURT: The itemized deduction I think 
needs a further response. 
MR. GREEN: The 12,000? 
THE COURT: Yes. Can you give kind of a 
breakdown with some further information so --
MR. GREEN: I hate to be the one that 
knows the least of all, but I understand that our CPA 
assumed the standard exemptions for deductions. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible). You had a 
further breakdown that was contained in the CPA 
letter, and I think 12,000 (inaudible). 




The tax credit, my client tells me, 
in 2006 she could not enjoy because of her income and 
she had been phased out of that. 
If I understand the respondent's view of 
this, he is basing his calculations according to 
the -- the filing that I received yesterday on my 
client's 2006 return. The argument being that 
the 2006 return is not speculative, it is known. 
The problem with the 2006 return is that 
the 2007 return will be different, and so will the 
next, and so was the previous return. 
What our CPA did was take the Court's 
finding of $35,000, I understood applied the standard 
deduction, and calculated the tax effect on those 
assumptions, which I think are the correct 
assumptions that we should make, and not based upon 
the 2006 experience in isolation. 
The respondent calls that speculative, I 
don't think so. I think as soon as the Court has 
made its ruling it goes beyond speculation and it is 
that -- then the law of the case. I think we should 
take the law of the case here, apply that with 
standard tax accounting principles and come up with a 
number. 
That is, I think, what Hr. Rasmussen did. 
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If he did not, then letfs ask him to look at whatever 
other considerations we might have, have him make 
that recommendation and either work it out or I guess 
submit it to Your Honor, although I don't think 
that' s necessary. 
THE COURT: My view is this is an 
indentured question. For my resolution of it, I need 
evi dence . 
Mr. Mohrman seems to be concerned that the 
sparseness of the estimation that Mr. Rasmussen made, 
without imputing his credentials at all, and -- and I 
suppose that what I need to see if you want me to 
resolve it is evidence that would establish the basis 
for each price compilation. 
I've got some more indications of what 
that is in breakdowns that you've indicated 
Mr. Rasmussen used and dealt with this Exhibit C, and 
I realize that this is somewhat of a -- of a late bit 
of information for you. But what I would be looking 
at is -- is the $35,000 amount, which should be the 
amount that is dealt with, because that's the basis 
on which I made the alimony calculation, so that 
should be the basis on which the income taxes is 
addressed as well, and with whatever realistic 
deductions and so on that were actually (inaudible) 
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that he established within this general timeframe. 
I'm not going to say it has to be the 2005 tax year 
or the 2006 year, but it ought to be something that 
at least establishes taking that 35,000, what the 
kinds of components of the tax valuation would be, if 
not the actual numbers (inaudible). 
So I'm going to ask the parties to address 
that. And you can either — I'd ask you to do this: 
First, get a report with some detail to each other 
that explains what your assumptions are from whatever 
expert you're using for this -- Mr. Rasmussen, I 
don't know what you used for this particular one --
but some report that would be a basis. 
If you can come to an agreement on that 
basis, you don't need to see me again. If you feel 
like I need to resolve it, I would ask for affidavits 
from either side to establish a factual basis for the 
underlying assumptions that there are here, and then 
we can either set up a hearing or you can submit it 
on (inaudible). 
MR. GREEN: I would agree with that, Your 
Honor. 
I'll make the proposal now that our tax 
expert, who is not Mr. Rasmussen, but the author of 
































well, I guess it is Mr. Rasmussen. I'm thinking of 




It's really - -
But this Mr. Rasmussen stands 
ready to speak with any other accountant and try to 
resolve some of these issues and --
THE COURT: It seems to me that the 
problem here is that there's no -- there's not enough 
information to (inaudible). 
MR. MOHRMAN: And so that I'm clear and 
that we don't go off in the wrong direction, what I 
understand the Court to be assuming is that -- two 
things: One, that the imputed amount of income for 
purposes of calculating this is $35,000, and that the 
Court's effort is to net $1882 to the petitioner. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you. 
MR. GREEN: Very well. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: I think that's more than 
f ai r 
MR. GREEN: I f I can s h o r t c i r c u i t t he 
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other argument as to the termination issue, we've 
resolved the 114 versus 102 months. 
The petitioner is concerned that the --
that she understand that -- what remedy she was given 
in light of the Court's findings regarding 
dissipation. 
With that in mind, she has as a proposal, 
more than anything else, suggested that one way to 
address that would be to include a non-termination 
upon cohabitation or remarriage clause as to alimony, 
hence the reference it is not in the Court's 
recommendation, it is simply her fundamental concern 
that we have picked up that dissipation to the 
Court's satisfaction. 
THE COURT: And, you know, I've looked at 
that and I've looked back through that portion, 
section C, of my ruling, and there were -- I 
referenced this at least three times in that section 
with the conclusion that the - - under these 
circumstances, if respondent's post-separation income 
is (inaudible), his property is considered in 
determining an equitable allocation of marital assets 
and unsecured debt. 
I've limited the effects of that to those 
two items, unsecured debt, and I made a conscious 
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decision to not to try to deal with that at all. And 
so based on my decision, that proposal, while it may 
be good faith, I'm not going to accept at this point. 
It's outside of (inaudible). 
MR. GREEN: Fair enough. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Let's see. Just give me one --
THE COURT: It should include essentially 
the standard termination for (inaudible). 
MR. GREEN: Agreed. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I do 
think we agree on that at this point. 
Let me just take a moment to be sure that 
I haven't passed something up. 
All right. Your Honor, then we go to 
issue 7, which we've entitled due dates and 
alternative remedies. And I have some observations 
here. And I do take respectful issue with a comment 
or two you made previously, and I hope that the Court 
will at least indulge me so that I can get my 
arguments out and --
THE COURT: No, I'm fine. 
MR. MOHRMAN: The --
THE COURT: I want to hear you and my mind 
is open on this. 
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1 MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you very much, Your 
2 Honor. 
3 The -- a couple of things, Your Honor. 
4 First, the Court determined that there was an 
5 arrearage of 26,509.16. The -- that's the issue 
6 where I pointed out earlier that you rejected the 
7 alternative remedy of an offset against the home, if 
8 you will recall that. And hence, my argument 
9 previously today with respect to the petitioner's 
10 suggestion in that regard. 
11 The Court also ordered that the respondent 
12 pay $20,000 of her attorney's fees. And you 
13 allocated the debt as set forth in Petitioner's 
14 Exhibit 39 and you didn't provide due dates or 
15 alternative remedies for anything except that you did 
16 provide that if certain payments weren't made within 
17 45 days of the order then you would simply give one 
18 year's credit of alimony, everything but the 
19 judgments would be there. 
20 Point number one, Your Honor, with respect 
21 to the 26,509.16, that's a judgment. And I believe 
22 that the Court correctly made the determination not 
23 to offset that. It's a judgment that can be executed 
24 upon and -- and satisfied if the respondent doesn't 
25 pay for it, likewise with the attorney's fees 
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of $20,0000. And I'm going to point something out as 
we get down the road. But the order merely provides 
for those amounts. 
The petitioner says if this amount is not 
paid in full to the petitioner within 30 days of the 
entry of this order -- and actually, in the proposed 
decree I think he said 60 -- then he should be 
required to pay a minimum of $600 per month to the 
arrearage until it's paid in full. 
A couple of problems with that. One, Your 
Honor, the question of whether or not the petitioner 
has the ability to pay the additional $600 per month. 
He is paying for additional children to 
the tune of over $3,000 a month in the Arkansas 
action. I don't think we have any factual basis for 
a determination at this point that $600 per month or 
this subsequent $500 for failure to pay the 
attorney's fees within 60 days are even doable. 
I am going to point out that the 
petitioner's income at present is being garnished at 
the rate of 50 percent, the maximum amount that can 
be garnished, on the two competing orders between 
Arkansas and here. 
The child's --
THE COURT: The r e s p o n d e n t ' s ? 
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MR. MOHRMAN: Yes, the respondent's 
income. And I believe, and I think that the record 
clearly shows, that pursuant to the Court's ruling as 
of January 16th, that, in fact, he has, on the 
underlying child support and alimony, actually 
overpaid that amount by $12,000 during that period of 
time taking in the Court's numbers. 
The way that the petitioner gets that he's 
underpaid is she realized on the temporary order. 
And while I -- why I take some issue with the Court's 
observation earlier is that the petitioner wants it 
both ways. She wants to take advantage of the 
previous Court order when it benefits her, but she 
doesn't when it doesn't. And that's not fair. The 
Goose-Gander Rule has to apply here one way or the 
other, and I think that that's what we need to do. 
As an example, if the Court's order of 
January 2006 is in place, the payments per month that 
are owed are 3,544. During that period of time, from 
February of 2006 through May of 2007, according to 
her own documents provided to me and the Office of 
Recovery Services, he had overpaid her during that 
year and a half $4,611.15. 
The -- during the period of time between 
July 2005 and your decision, he overpaid $8,000.57. 
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Now, I don't care how you slice it, he's 
overpaid. And --
THE COURT: Tell me what the 3,544 is. 
That's from my ruling? 
MR. MOHRMAN: That's from your ruling. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Now, she wants to rely on 
the prior -- the temporary order, Your Honor. But 
then she wants to hold Mr. Baggett to your ruling 
where it's convenient for her on these other issues, 
and that' s not fair. 
The -- the fact is, he's -- these amounts 
have been paid to her. And if there is any question 
or concern on evidence -- I dare say I know 
Ms. Robinson and I know she's not going to deny 
payments that have been made to her. But what they 
have done is decide that certain payments, for 
example, the $11,618 payment made in November 
of 2005, his income tax return was captured by ORS. 
She wants to apply that to the judgment as opposed to 
the ongoing support. 
Well, I say you apply it to all the 
ongoing support first, and then if it's current, any 
excess gets applied to the judgment. And by our 




troubling to us. 
And, look, Mr. Baggett has his 
shortcomings. There is no question about that. But 
the truth of the matter is, Your Honor, he's being 
garnished for all of these payments and they -- they 
get fully 50 percent of his paycheck. 
When you take that into consideration and 
those amounts are in excess over the last year and a 
half of the amounts that were owed under the Court's 
order of January 2006, it's difficult to argue that 
he's trying to grind her into the dust, because 
that's not what's happening at all. 
Now, he has an arrearage that he has to 
pay of -- a judgment of 26,000 and attorney's fees 
of 20,000. If my numbers are right, and I believe 
that they are, then the judgment should be reduced 
by $12,000 down to around 13 and change and the 
attorney's fees are still pending of 20,000 that he 
owes. But he is current on his support. I don't 
think that that should be lost in this calculation. 
Now, how did he become current? By 
garnishment and by grabbing his income tax return. 
But they happened, and he should get credit for those 
thi ngs . 
What the petitioner is attempting to do --
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and, again, I don't fault her, I believe this is in 
good faith. She's saying he's in arrears because 
I've taken that 11,000 and I've moved it over here to 
satisfy a portion of the judgment. And I don't think 
that that's proper -- from the garnishment. 
The long and short of it is with respect 
to that point, Your Honor, is that the order should 
simply say as follows, and then the petitioner can 
execute on it as she wishes: There is a judgment 
for 26,509 and there's a judgment for attorney's fees 
of $20,000. And she can execute on those judgments, 
especially when the $20,000 is entered as a judgment, 
which it will be in the decree if he doesn't pay it. 
I dare say that what will happen is they 
will -- once they are reduced to judgments, they will 
get paid. I think that's going to happen, but I 
can't -- obviously I can make no promises, I'm 12,000 
miles away from my client. 
THE COURT: You know, I guess the -- the 
appeal of the proposal, the 600 and 500 if these 
things aren't paid, is in some sense -- I recognize 
what you're saying, is that these are -- that they 
will be executable as judgments. But as judgments 
being executable, there's additional procedural hoops 




What Mr. Green appears to be proposing is 
that there be an alternative payment, a payment that 
they wouldn't have to start jumping through those 
hoops, but could take care of the concern that I had, 
which was her inability to continue to pay the 
installment debt based on a calculation that I made. 
And I specifically excluded both installment debt and 
the attorney's fee obligation from alimony 
calculations because I was going to deal with them in 
this way. 
What he's pointed out, essentially -- and 
I - - and I think in that sense, the idea was that 
they either have a judgment paid or a judgment 
executable. But I also see that if this goes on for 
a long period of time -- and it has gone on a longer 
period than I anticipated, or that any of us 
anticipated -- that she's still got the burden of the 
ongoing obligations without another way to do it. 
Now, on some level this seems to also 
offer your client an alternative. That is, that he 
can get executed on and pay the $600 and $500 a month 
as some way to sort of keep the avalanche from coming 
in on execution on them, the burdens and extra 
expenses of that. I don't know if that's intended 




in play. I mean, both of those things would be going 
on at the same time, but it's certainly something to 
think about it. 
But I do see a problem here that I hadn't 
really anticipated. So I hear what you're saying --
MR. HOHRMAN: There's one other fact that 
I left out with respect to how these orders 
interplay. 
The Court ordered that my client take half 
the debt. But with respect to the petitioner, she 
has taken the position that the original Court order 
applies. She's continued to make payments on that 
credit card debt and hasn't made any arrangements for 
my client to pay his half of the debt, and then comes 
into court today and says he hasn't done anything. 
It's not fair, Your Honor. And that issue is of 
great concern here. 
THE COURT: Well, then he needs to step in 
and start paying that. I mean, I -- it kind of cuts 
both ways. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Well, I suspect that it 
does, Your Honor. But he did try to do that 
initially when we first started this and all of --
all of the negotiations broke down over, frankly, a 




And with respect to the Court, the delay 
hurt us both. I mean, it hurt both sides and they 
were in limbo and they didn't really know what to do 
during that period of time. But the period of time I 
talked to him about is between January and the time 
that we got orders out. 
So I -- the part that I'm anxious to 
protect my client on, Your Honor, I don't see him --
honestly do not see him as the nefarious fellow that 
he's being portrayed to be. He has significant 
financial burdens with which he is attempting to 
deal. And part of the reason that he moved to the 
Philippines, which -- where he does not want to be --
is so that he could free up cash. 
THE COURT: And that was heard at trial. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And so I -- the -- what I 
don't like about the proposal, Your Honor, is that 
it's fully outside of what the Court said and it's 
dealing with issues that the Court otherwise dealt 
with in other provisions. And I really do believe 
that -- that when the Court said I'm just -- I'm 
going to give you an extra year of alimony if he 
doesn't pay this amount, I think that was the 
combination the Court had in mind at the time. 
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I'm sorry. I've dominated this --
THE COURT: The concerns I have here --
and I'm talking to Mr. Green as well as Mr. Mohrman. 
I don't necessarily disagree with - - in your 
analysis. But what I'm looking for is to take care 
of the problems that seem to now have developed so 
that it doesn't get any further. 
And so there seem to be some options. One 
is this order, although on some level $600 a month is 
enforceable by order to show cause. In any event, 
it's not something that's automatic. It's not 
something that is going to be ORS kinds of 
garnishment -- loan garnishment you're going to get 
as through execution. 
So the question I have here is can I order 
the judgment to be paid within a certain amount of 
time? Because I'm concerned about this as not only a 
money issue solely, but kind of an equitable issue in 
terms of the ongoing obligations of Ms. Robinson and 
not willing to really treat it solely as a judgment 
for her to take her chances on. I want to have some 
ability to have the - - to have the ability to sort of 
make that happen. It's appropriate to do that. 
You've indicated some optimism that it 




this point, but things happen. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Well, we're working on that, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So the question I have 
is I said that there's a penalty for failure to pay 
it within a certain amount of time after my ruling 
was issued. That time's gone and that's being 
imposed. 
I also, I suppose -- I very distinctly 
made the decision I made in order to not have to 
overcomplicate the alimony calculation, not in my own 
purposes, but for the purposes of making it realistic 
for the parties to actually be able to handle it. 
And because of the fact that installment debt tends 
to get paid off at various levels and the amount of 
debt might not be appropriate for an ongoing monthly 
obligation over 102 months versus being paid off all 
at once, there were a lot of reasons for the reason I 
did that. But I'm also concerned that she not be 
unduly burdened with this without a simple remedy. 
So could we have a provision that we --
that these obligations, the attorney's fees and 
the $25,000 arrearages, be paid off in a -- within 
a -- some amount of time? Six months? Eight months? 
Something like that? So that it could be the subject 
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more of a show cause and that I would have some 
options to then exercise some options in terms of 
trying to get it paid that would not involve her 
executing on them? 
MR. MOHRMAN: A couple of points, and I'll 
try to make in quick. 
In answer to question your directly: One, 
I don't have authority, Your Honor, to say that. As 
I -- I would certainly discuss that with my client 
and I would get back with you and Mr. Green on a 
telephone conference call and actually answer that 
question directly as soon as possible, if the Court 
is so disposed. 
But an observation that I do have is that 
these are judgments, but we're in a divorce court and 
his failure to pay a judgment is always subject to an 
order to show cause in any event. 
THE COURT: Do you agree with that, 
Mr. Green? 
MR. GREEN: No. No, I do not. You've got 
to reserve that, Your Honor. All too often I've had 
clients who get judgments and only to hear the Court 
say you have your remedy, it's a judgement remedy, I 




I think that the analysis I just heard is 
correct as a matter of law, but I think you need to 
articulate and say I'm not leaving her to her 
judgment remedy, it is an equitable matter, I will 
entertain this in a contempt context. But I think 
you have to - - I think you have to say that. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And, Your Honor, I think 
that you have that authority and I -- and I, frankly, 
can stipulate to that because in a contempt -- the 
contempt issues that apply are whether or not my 
client can comply in order for an order of contempt 
to apply. 
So I - - I don't have any difficulty with 
the position Mr. Green has just taken. I think 
it's -- I understand why he's saying what he's 
saying. I've had that same concern. I think we both 
agree, though, that you do have that equitable 
authority and - -
THE COURT: What if I say this: That the 
judgments will be paid within 60 days of my execution 
of the order, and then we'll leave it to contempt 
proceedings after that to deal with it? 
And I think that that deals with the 
reality then, because Mr. Green's right, of course, 
and you're right, that contempt proceedings deal with 
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1 the ability to pay. And there's the blood and the 
2 turnip aspect of this certainly that there's -- that 
3 and this -- this case. But that would give me the 
4 ability stated to then start taking whatever steps 
5 that are legally available. 
6 MR. MOHRMAN: I think you completely have 
7 that authority, Your Honor, and I --
8 MR. GREEN: I think --
9 THE COURT: I mean, I'm a little 
10 uncomfortable -- you know, I've looked at your 600 
11 and 500, and I wasn't unsympathetic to the concept, 
12 but I don't know that that's something I'm willing to 
13 do at this point. It may be something I'm willing to 
14 do on a contempt order. 
15 MR. GREEN: I have some suggestions that 
16 will mitigate this issue to some degree, but I'm 
17 going to have to expand my response to meet that of 
18 Mr. Baggett's counsel, because we've kind of blended 
19 issue 7, which is the credit cards, the attorney's 
20 fees and the arrearage issue, with number 10, which 
21 is the effective date of Your Honor's order. 
22 Having said that, if I can have just a 
23 little leeway, I'd like to approach Your Honor with 
24 an accounting for arrearages under the temporary 
25 order, if that pleases the Court. 
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THE COURT: Come on up. 
MR. GREEN: Thank you. 
As counsel just mentioned, this is 
something we sent to counsel I think on several 
occasions, perhaps most recently early June. And 
this is part of my concern over the Exhibit B is we 
sent it in early June and were promised a response 
from Mr. Baggett shortly, but I think we can get past 
that. 
This has some pertinence to the question 
of under what order are we functioning, should there 
be an order for the arrearages? And let me deal with 
that question first. 
In short, the petitioner's view is that 
the assumption of debt in particular and the payment 
of judgments as well are inextricably linked to the 
Court's ruling regarding alimony and child support. 
In other words, alimony went down, but on 
the assumption, in part, that Mr. Baggett would step 
up to the plate, take some $48,000 in credit card 
debt and start paying it. He simply did not. 
Not only did he not make any payment 
directly to the creditor, he made no effort 
whatsoever to contribute to my client's payment of 
those accounts, the most of which, if not all, are in 
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her name. Full known to Mr. Baggett, of course. 
He could have sent through counsel a 
suggestion for a mechanism to resolve that. He could 
have sent a check directly or through counsel for 
that. He has not done that. 
In short, he has operated under the 
assumption that the ruling, at least in this 
particular, was not binding and was not controlling 
until it is included in the supplemental decree. 
That's how he's behaved. 
To give you an idea of the magnitude, Your 
Honor, this comes to some $1120 a month in 
i nstallments. 
Furthermore, the principal on those 
accounts, which are serviced by my client per the 
temporary order and since the ruling, indeed since 
the trial, have reduced the balance on those accounts 
by less than a thousand dollars because she has been 
able to only make those minimum payments. 
The accounting you have before you is an 
accounting of the arrearages since the trial. 
Mr. Baggett is simply mistaken when he suggests that 
credit for his tax refund, which was intercepted by 
ORS, has not been accounted for. 
At the top on the right-hand side you will 
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see that the ORS did indeed intercept the 11,593. It 
was credited to post-trial arrearages. Well, 
post-trial obligations. Not the $26,817 judgment, 
which the Court found after the trial -- or as of the 
date of the trial. That --
THE COURT: What arrearages was it? 
Post-trial? 
MR. GREEN: Post-trial obligations. He 
had 7-1-05 through 7-1-07 some 21,173 due, ORS has 
credited him 11,593. 
THE COURT: That is in the temporary 
order? 
MR. GREEN: That is his tax refund which 
he believes --
THE COURT: No. But the arrearages were 
applied against the baseline of the temporary order? 
MR. GREEN: Correct. Correct. That's how 
ORS is calculating it. Resulting in an additional 
arrearage under the temporary order of 9,580. You'll 
see it's added to the 26,817. That was June of '05. 
Another 9,580. 
The problem with Mr. Baggett's calculation 
is, number one, he's calculating his overpayment now 
he says under what he perceives to be the Court's 




The problem with that is he's using the 
net alimony number and he is really getting the cart 
before the horse because we do not have yet the 
alimony number. We've already talked about that, and 
we have a good methodology to resolve that. But it's 
going to be more than what Mr. Baggett thinks and 
more than he's assumed in his accounting, because 
he's using only the net number. And if were to adopt 
his approach we would have to then go back and pick 
up the differential between the net and the gross 
alimony, which has yet to be determined. 
That, in short, is the problem. My client 
has had all of the burden of the debt that 
Mr. Baggett was supposed to pay. This is not a 
Goose-Gander issue or principle as to her, but it is 
as to Mr. Baggett. He wishes the benefits of lower 
alimony without the additional obligation of taking 
on that debt. 
I view the unsecured debt issue as 
somewhat different than the judgment issue for 
arrearages and attorney's fees. The unsecured debt 
issue should not be deferred to a later date. 
Mr. Baggett should be ordered within 30 days to 
assume and start paying on those debts, and, frankly, 




client's name or else he has an undue benefit and 
lever by simply not paying these to force my client 
in a perpetual position of covering for his 
arrearages and defaults. 
As to the $20,000 attorney's fees 
and 26,509, which for some reason it's now 26,817, 
I'm not quite sure what the difference is, that might 
be interest or something, but whatever. As to the 
judgment that the Court ordered and found as of the 
date of the trial, we should not be parsing remedies 
or words about how to satisfy that. It doesn't make 
a lot of sense for Mr. Baggett to say, well, I've got 
this $23,000 asset over here which is my lien in the 
house, but I've got $46,000 in obligations that I owe 
directly to the petitioner. 
What he should say, and what we should all 
say, is the Courts in this state favor a clean break. 
My client should not be left to a position where she 
has to go to the academic exercise of getting the 
judgment entered, executing on that judgment, 
presumably against his equity lien on the house, when 
the Court has the equitable power to simply say I'm 
setting off 23,000, or whatever dollars it is, his 
share of the equity, I'm going to set that off and 
deduct it from the judgment that the Court has found 
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is appropriate, rather than requiring that my client 
go through the considerable expense of executing or 
enforcing those judgments. 
THE COURT: Is that what was proposed in 
the first place? 
MR. GREEN: I don't know. 
MR. MOHRMAN: I'm a little surprised, 
because that's what we proposed at trial and I 
understood it was objected to. And, no, I have no 
objection to that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that a better 
solution for --
MR. GREEN: It is a partial but better 
solution, I think. I'm going to 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GREEN: I mean, I'll — 
THE COURT: I'm going to make this easier 
for everybody. 
MR. GREEN: Well, I think that's easier. 
MS. ROBINSON: And if I may just interject 
very briefly. Assuming that the Court is going to 
find that actually he's in arrears now $36,397.68 
since July '05 under the temporary order, because 
he -- according to this, he's 9,000 more in arrears, 
then, yes, that would be perfectly fine with me for 
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1 him to offset the 23, which would reduce the amount 
2 he would owe me down to about 13,000 for the 
3 arrearage itself and 20 for the attorney fees. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
5 MR. GREEN: So anyway, that's why we have 
6 suggested that she would have the option or the 
7 election to take the judgment amount as a credit 
8 against the home equity. 
9 I've dealt with the unsecured debt. He 
10 has got to get that into his own name. 
11 As to the -- as to the methodology of 
12 periodic payments, I think the Court is on track 
13 there. We're now 18 months since the ruling and 
14 Mr. Baggett should have had enough time to get his 
15 affairs in order to retire those. 
16 I would suggest that he be given a 
17 reasonable time, I would think that that's 90 days, 
18 to either arrange for the payment of those 
19 obligations or for the Court to identify in its 
20 ruling today that he should come up with a way of 
21 retiring those on an installment basis. And I say 
22 that for the simple reason that my client effectively 
23 has no remedy by way of garnishment because of his 50 
24 percent withholding now which is due to matters 
25 beyond my client's control, mainly, Mr. Baggett's 
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other family and other proceedings involving child 
support. And I won't get into that whole story, but 
effectively, if my client is just left to her 
judgment remedies, that's really very little remedy 
for her. She -- I think we need to look at 
installments and contempt. And it sounds like that's 
where we're heading, and that's fine. 
Can I be of any further assistance on 
those issues, Your Honor? I hope I treated them 
fully. 
THE COURT: I don't think so. 
MR. GREEN: Thank you. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Your Honor, just brief 
rebuttal, if I may. 
First, with respect to the numbers here on 
the accounting of arrearages, let's be really careful 
about what these numbers are. The $26,000 is already 
reduced to a judgment. I don't want it to be double 
counted. So that's there. 
The $9,000 over -- arrearage that they are 
alleging is based upon the temporary order, not the 
numbers from the Court's ruling of January of 2006. 
If the Court's order of January 2006 
applies, the number is less. It's $12,000 the other 
way. 
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And the petitioner is doing two things 
that I think we need to be really careful of. One, 
the numbers that ORS are -- is collecting on are the 
numbers related to the 2006 ruling, which were 
supplied to it by the petitioner. That was done, I 
assume, because ORS would not garnish for the house 
payment. Thus, what she has been able to do during 
this time is to rely on the 2006 order, but come to 
the Court and argue that I'm not going to use 
the 2006 order, it should be the two thousand -- the 
temporary order from 2003. That's inequitable. It 
i s . 
Mr. Baggett, if we go by your numbers, has 
overpaid by $12,000. We are almost at a wash, given 
my analysis of these numbers, if the house goes on --
THE COURT: Well, that's without the net 
(i naudi ble). 
MR. MOHRMAN: Mr. Green's argument there 
is dead on. He's a hundred percent correct, and I 
don't disagree. 
THE COURT: And I understand that. And 
let's -- let's say -- I'm trying to figure out how to 
make this work. 
There's some amount somewhere between 250 




alimony to get the net effect. She hasn't been 
getting that. 
MR. MOHRMAN: We all agree with that, Your 
Honor, yes. 
THE COURT: So she's not been getting 
complete payments, partly because there isn't a 
complete payment. But, your know, your client 
certainly is giving himself the benefit of the doubt 
of this, and part of this, a big chunk of it, is 
somebody garnished his tax return rather than just 
voluntary goodwill in this. 
He hasn't taken over the payment of the 
debts that I allocated to him under that 2006 order, 
she's been left to pay them. And I know from what we 
discussed at the time because of the parties' 
situation -- separate financial situation when they 
entered the marriage, most of that debt's in her name 
because she has essentially been -- was the only one 
with enough credit to get these cards. 
So he's -- he seems to me to be sifting 
this to a certain extent to his advantage. However, 
practical (inaudible). I mean, I recognize that 
there may be some issues there in terms of the 
ability to pay. But in any event, it seems to me 




























taken advantage of the lower non-net amount -- or net 
amount only and failed to take on the obligation and 
failed to pay any amounts and was forced to pay 
whatever overages you're claiming as a result of 
somebody garnishing his -- his tax return. 
So I don't see a lot of goodwill operating 
here on the part of your client. I see him doing 
what it appears to me that he did before, which is 
only paying after somebody gets hold of him and 
shakes him. 
I'm -- I'm very unwilling to reward that, 
but I want a practical solution to this. And part of 
the issue seems to me to be to -- to deal with the 
effects of his -- what he seems to me to be doing is 
just taking advantage of what helps him and not. 
I see what you're saying for her, and 
there certainly is some calculations here that gives 
a certain amount of advantage, but it's minuscule in 
comparison to what I see your client's causing this 
problem. I'm not sure I'll willing to accept 
anybody's pleadings here as they're given to me at 




May I offer a --
-- I'm very concerned 
-- possible solution? 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. GREEN: That whenever either upon the 
entry of the supplemental decree or when Mr. Baggett 
starts paying the $48,000 installment debts, at that 
point, from that point forward we start calculating 
under the Court's findings and rulings of January 
of '06. 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond to 
that? 
MR. MOHRMAN: I don't want to be obtuse, 
but I'm not sure I understood the suggestion. 
MR. GREEN: When he is willing to take the 
obligations of the ruling he should have the benefits 
thereof. In the month when he starts paying 
that $48,000, I think it is, of installment debt, in 
whatever methodology he wishes, a check to my client, 
through counsel, to the creditor, in that month, he 
can start reaping the benefits of Your Honor's ruling 
of lower alimony, subject to the ruling we already 
have on how to resolve that number. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Again, Your Honor, with --
with respect, I have to decline that offer because it 
doesn't seem like it really does anything but require 
my client to do what he's obligated to do in any 
event, plus deny him, frankly, the benefit of the 
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Court ' s order . 
I have to say this about the 48,000: I'm 
unaware of the petitioner submitting one credit card 
bill to my client, and she's the one that controls 
them and gets them. I haven't seen them. 
THE COURT: Let me suggest this: It seems 
to me that my ruling -- that my order ought to take 
place as of the date of the ruling, that the - - it 
will be the gross amount of that 1882 as of January. 
And that because the respondent has not taken over 
the debt, that he should be required to pay the 
amount that Ms. Robinson has had to pay that would 
otherwise have been not -- she would not have been 
required to pay if he'd taken over that debt. 
MR. MOHRMAN: His portion of the 48,000, 
the additional expenses. 
THE COURT: And he has whatever benefit 
of -- and that would include everything she's paid on 
it, including interest and principal. 
MR. MOHRMAN: I understand, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And that would take -- that 
would satisfy, it seems to me, my concerns about 
what's happened here, while still making 
implementation of my ruling, which was thought out in 
some length in terms of what was appropriate in terms 
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of child support and -- and alimony and put that into 
place. 
The concern I have is just continuing the 
temporary order because it also continues amounts of 
child support and -- and alimony, which I calculated 
on a much more detailed basis than is under the 
temporary orders in a way that doesn't take effect --
Go ahead, Mr. Green. 
MR. GREEN: I agree. My client will have 
a slight burden of proving what she has paid on 
behalf of the respondent on those debts, but I've 
asked her, she said she can do that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And I think that's right, 
Your Honor. That -- that's --
THE COURT: Let's do that. And then at 
that point, how do we put that into effect of the 
order? 
MR. MOHRMAN: Well --
THE COURT: There will be an additional 
arrearage, essentially, that will be in addition to 
the $25,000. 
MR. MOHRMAN: There are two questions that 
I have. If Your Honor is actually saying that it's 
from the date of the order, then I think our 
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calculation application is closer to what's correct. 
But I believe that Mr. Green and I can go through and 
we can identify those numbers. That's a matter of 
the numbers. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: But my client will have an 
obligation to add -- so the arrearage might be 
reduced, but it's going to go right back up 
substantially because of the credit card debt, as I 
understand it. 
MR. GREEN: Well, not only that. 
Obviously we have to come to the gross number of 
alimony. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Right. 
MR. GREEN: Those are the two -- those are 
the two deltas that we have to deal with. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Right. And so what I'd like 
to know from the Court, we're going to submit 
basically brief representations of what our experts 
will say on what the alimony ought to be in order to 
net the 18 and change, correct? 
MR. GREEN: That's only if we can't 
resolve it ourselves. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Which we probably could do 
in short order, because as the Court observed, we're 
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between 280 and 500 and something. We're not all 
that far apart. 
And then the other issue is awaiting from 
petitioner the calculation of what she paid on behalf 
of the respondent. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Including principal, 
interest and penalties. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Okay. I just wanted to be 
sure that I have articulated that correctly. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
As to the judgment, 45 days after entering 
the order, the attorney's fees and the arrearages are 
to be paid. And at that point then the Court has 
equitable tools to deal with those issues as they 
come up, however -- however they arise. 
MR. GREEN: Very well, Your Honor. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thanks. 
THE COURT: Okay. What else do I need to 
look at? 
MR. MOHRMAN: Well, let me -- let me make 
sure, Your Honor, that --




MR. GREEN: Oh, Your Honor, one last 
thing. Can we have a time on -- by which he will 
transfer his portion of the debt to his name rather 
than leaving it in my client's? 
THE COURT: That -- that will be 30 days. 
MR. GREEN: Thirty days. Thank you. 
MR. MOHRMAN: From the entry of your 
order, is that what you're saying, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: (Inaudible. ) 
MR. MOHRMAN: Okay. 
MR. GREEN: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Okay. Health insurance and 
medical expenses, Your Honor. I think that's what 
we're -- did I skip number 8? 
MR. GREEN: We skipped --
THE COURT: His obligation, by the way, to 
pay her will continue so long as that's not done, 
(i naudi ble). 
MR. GREEN: Very well. Thank you. 
MR. MOHRMAN: All right. That's fair. 
First, Your Honor, the tax deduction for 
the child — 
MR. GREEN: I can make that simple, Your 
Honor. 
The Court does have the option of being 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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silent on that issue. Respondent's argument is that 
you were, we're fine with that. Then the parties 
resort to the IRS rules on that point. That's fine. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to deal with 
that on that basis then, Mr. Mohrman? 
MR. MOHRMAN: Your Honor, I would like the 
Court order to reflect that my client may claim the 
deduction if he is current and in every other year --
every other year he may claim them so long as he is 
current in his support obligation. 
MR. GREEN: Well, what he put here -- I'm 
just going by what I got last night -- was no 
findings were made regarding which party would be 
awarded the tax deductions -- and I think that means 
exemption for the parties' child -- no order was made 
regarding the tax deduction for the parties' child. 




You're okay with that? 
Yes. 
Are you okay with that? 
MR. MOHRMAN: No, I'm not, because his 
position was originally -- and the reason we brought 
it up -- was that the tax deduction ordered to 
alternate between the parties. 




That's my standard tax deduction in any divorce that 
-- unless there's some clear reason not to do that. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And all I want is the 
language to say but if he's current in his support 
obligation he may claim it in that year, otherwise he 
can't claim it. That's -- that's fair. 
THE COURT: And that's what we originally 
had; is that right? 
MR. MOHRMAN: Well, it's slightly 
different than that. 
MR. GREEN: I -- I thought that's what I 
had. 
THE COURT: It looked to me like that --
let me -- let me read what was there --
MR. MOHRMAN: I -- you know what? I -- I 
apologize to the Court. I think I misread this. 
May -- just give me one second. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. MOHRMAN: The support obligations, 
what I'm after though, Your Honor, is that that's --
THE COURT: Child support. 
MR. MOHRMAN: -- child support. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's the order, child 
support. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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MR. GREEN: I might point out, Your Honor, 
this will create confusion for our accountants, 
because they ' 11 - -
THE COURT: Well, tell me -- like I say, 
I'm not wedded to this. I want to make this as 
simple as I can, so --
MR. GREEN: When he -- as long as he's 
paying alimony, there's now going to be two different 
gross alimony numbers, one number for when she can 
claim the exemption in that year, one number when she 
does not. That's just going to be a fact of life --
THE COURT: Tell me -- I didn't understand 
that. 
MR. GREEN: Well, if she does not have the 
exemption, then her tax on the alimony's going to be 
higher, because the exemption is a credit against 
income. It may not be dramatic, I really don't know. 
I really try to leave that up to the accountants. 
But --
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you both: Is 
it easier to leave it unresolved than for it to be by 
law? 
MR. MOHRMAN: Well --
MR. GREEN: If we do not do anything and 
we leave it to IRS rules, what we don't have to worry 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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about is whether he's current or not, and it 
certainly facilitates the gross alimony calculation. 
THE COURT: What is the IRS rule that 
applies? 
MR. GREEN: My client's going to have the 
exemption. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Forever. That's the 
problem. My client won't be able to claim him 
because the IRS presumption is that the parent 
contributes the most to the -- and the custodial 
parent is the one who contributes the most to the 
support of a child and therefore can claim them. 
With these numbers, however, and the 
amount that the Court has imputed, I don't think that 
that's accurate. And so that's why I objected to the 
IRS recommendation. We're both fully aware of what 
the IRS rules are on it. 
Mr. Green, again, is correct when he says 
it's going to cause an issue for the accountants, but 
it's a simple matter to figure with the deduction or 
without. And if it's going to create a big number, I 
will then probably recommend to my client that he 
simply stipulate that the petitioner be able to claim 




1 MR. GREEN: I've heard this before. If 
2 Mr. Mohrman's reasonableness could be imputed to the 
3 respondent, we would not have as many issues as we do 
4 today. 
5 If the Court is implying to allow him 
6 alternating years, I would ask -- I would ask only 
7 that it be tied to not only his compliance with child 
8 support, but other child support -- or chiId-related 
9 expenses, meaning day care, which probably doesn't 
10 exist, maybe it does, and certainly medical- related 
11 expenses. 
12 MR. MOHRMAN: I would stipulate to that, 
13 Your Honor. 
14 MR. GREEN: Very well. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. What else? 
16 MR. MOHRMAN: All right. So that handles 
17 that. 
18 Then the medical issue here, this is one 
19 of those issues where I think it was just an 
20 oversight on the Court's part that it didn't include 
21 health insurance premiums. I think both of us 
22 contemplate that my client should be obligated to 
23 maintain health coverage for the benefit of Kalen. 
24 THE COURT: Is that the way it's going to 
25 work is that -- is that Mr. Baggett will -- will have 
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the health insurance come through his employment? 
MR. MOHRMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: That's -- that's a better 
soluti on? 
MR. GREEN: That's where it is now, I 
think that's where it will remain. 
MR. MOHRMAN: The part that we take issue 
with, Your Honor, is that he be responsible for 
paying the first $900 in medical expenses to meet the 
family deducti ble. 
THE COURT: What's the (inaudible)? 
MR. MOHRMAN: I actually don't know, but 
the parties should split the deductible equally. 
MR. GREEN: It's $900. 
MR. MOHRMAN: That's what the statutory 
provision is when you're getting child support and 
ali mony. 
MR. GREEN: This is a somewhat complicated 
issue because of his inclusion under his policy of 
his children from other relationships and the 
marri age . 
THE COURT: Do they count for the payment 
of the deductible? 
MR. GREEN: May I inquire, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
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MS. ROBINSON: What the situation is is 
with the -- the 900 is a family deductible, and it 
can be a 250 -- it's my understanding -- a 250 per 
person deductible, but if there's -- or, 900, 
whichever comes first. 
THE COURT: Whichever is less. 
MS. ROBINSON: Uh-huh (affirmative). And 
the concern that we had, and that's the reason why 
with the temporary order we stipulated to doing the 
900, is under his policy he's covered his -- his 
current wife is covered, the other three children and 
my son. So there is the potential there that, you 
know --
THE COURT: That there's an advantage --
that he'll have covered it before it ever becomes an 
issue 
MR. GREEN: Or not. 
MS. ROBINSON: Right. 
MR. GREEN: Or that she will pay a 
disproportionate share of that -- that amount to the 
benefit of these others. 
THE COURT: So -- okay, I see the problem 
here. The nine -- paying the first $900 doesn't seem 
to me to address it accurately. 
How -- how can we make it work then? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 MR. GREEN: I would suggest that there be 
2 a number that he would pay that would be 
3 representative of this case, maybe $250, whatever, 
4 that he would pay, and then after that they would 
5 split it 50/50. 
6 MR. MOHRMAN: If there is a deductible, 
7 right. 
8 MS. ROBINSON: There is a deductible. 
9 MR. MOHRMAN: No, but if -- if it's not 
10 already used up. 
11 MR. GREEN: It would --
12 MS. ROBINSON: Oh, that's true. 
13 THE COURT: Would it be possible to have 
14 this calculated on an annual basis? 
15 MR. GREEN: Yes, I think so. 
16 THE COURT: That is at the end of the year 
17 you figure out how much was actually -- had to be 
18 paid, and if nobody else got any health coverage but 
19 Kalen then you split that $250? 
20 MS. ROBINSON: Right. 
21 THE COURT: If everybody else got the --
22 if the family deductible was met, you'd do some 
23 proportional number of that, like one-sixth, or 
24 however many other people there are. 




MR. MOHRMAN: I think it ought to be per 
person on the policy, and then -- but only -- they 
would only divide Kalen's share, which would reduce 
her obligation substantially and would be far less. 
MS. ROBINSON: That's fine. 
MR. GREEN: I believe my client 
understands that proposal, whether I do or not, and 
she ' s sayi ng yes to it. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Yeah. 
MR. GREEN: We're now starting to slice it 
pretty thin here. 
THE COURT: Work that out then. 
MR. GREEN: Okay. 
MR. MOHRMAN: I know what she's thinking 
and I'm thinking the same thing and it will reduce 
that number way down for her. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's do that. 
MR. GREEN: And I think with that we're 
done . 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Mohrman, 
that you're aware of? 
MR. MOHRMAN: No, Your Honor, except thank 




THE COURT: Well, and I apologize for any 
confusion that I may have introduced into this, but 
you have all taken it into stride here and I'm sorry 
about any confusion. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I 
think this is a tough case, and --
THE COURT: I hope it's a tough case, 
because it certainly was for me. If not, then --
MR. GREEN: I would vote for tough, Your 
Honor . 
THE COURT: Well, I understand -- you 
know, Ms. Robinson, you're the only party here with 
your attorney, and you understand that the levity of 
this thing here doesn't ignore the issue (inaudible). 
So I appreciate the good work that 
everybody's done on this. 
And with that, the Court's in recess. 
Thank you. 
Honor 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you so much, Your 
MR. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: All right. Let's go on the 
4 record in case number 034901865, and have the counsel 
5 and parties make their appearances, please. 
6 MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Mike 
7 Mohrman on behalf of Alex Earl Baggett, Your Honor. 
8 And Mr. Baggett is not here today. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 MR. GREEN: May it please the Court, Rick 
11 Green appearing for the petitioner, who is present. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 Let's talk for a moment, if we could. I'm 
14 not sure quite how to tackle this, in a way. I got 
15 through reading the courtesy copies and so forth that 
16 you submitted last night at about 10:30. I read 
17 every page. Very interesting. 
18 A lot of thoughts come to mind. And I 
19 made an inquiry this morning as to how I got the case 
20 if this was all being done and handled and dealt with 
21 by Judge Roth, who seems to me to be perhaps in a 
22 more unique or better position to make a ruling, if 
23 it gets that far, as to the clarification issues that 
24 he intended and where he was going on it. Otherwise, 
25 I would see myself being at a slight disadvantage to 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
1 Judge Roth in making those decisions, simply because 
2 he was the one that was involved and knew what he 
3 intended and where he was going to go, and I would 
4 simply have to try to figure as best I could on the 
5 record and make a call if we got into the merits of 
6 it. 
7 I have given some thought, assuming we got 
8 over the hurdle and granted the motion — assuming 
9 that, I'm not saying we will -- but assuming that, of 
10 whether or not I would be required to keep and handle 
11 it or whether I could approach Judge Roth and have 
12 him take a look at it. 
13 I don't know what the parties preference 
14 would be if that got to that point or not. 
15 Any thoughts there? 
16 MR. MOHRMAN: I'll take the first stab and 
17 then I'll let Mr. Green go. 
18 Your Honor, I believe it would be fair to 
19 say that that was our preference to be begin with. 
20 And we had, I think you can see from the 
21 correspondence, attempted to do that on a couple of 
22 occasions. 
23 THE COURT: And, you know, frankly, I 
24 was -- I was very pleased in some of the things that 
25 I saw, and very disturbed at some of the things I 
CitiCourt, LLC 
(801) 532-3441 
1 saw. You've made a lot of work, you've made a lot of 
2 efforts, and you've not let it slip through the 
3 cracks. And that's very pleasing. But by the same 
4 token, it's disturbing it hasn't been resolved. 
5 MR. MOHRMAN: And, Your Honor, there's 
6 plenty of blame to go around with respect to that. 
7 I think -- Mr. Green and I were discussing 
8 this this morning, and we just want to get it done. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Well, we — 
10 MR. MOHRMAN: My personal opinion is that 
11 Judge Roth would be in a better position to do it. 
12 However, I also believe that you, frankly, can do it 
13 as well. 
14 THE COURT: Here's my thought if I took 
15 it. I didn't mean to cut you off. 
16 MR. MOHRMAN: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: But what I thought what we 
18 would do is just simply handle the threshold issue of 
19 whether or not to grant the motion for Rule 16(b) for 
20 not. 
21 If it did, I was tinkeringwith the idea 
22 | of asking both of you to go back one last time and 
23 get the order completely consistent with what 
24 Judge Roth had asked. I was then going to try to do 




1 get it worked out and you were both in agreement and 
2 if I needed to step in and handle each issue one at a 
3 time, I would sanction somebody for whoever was 
4 wrong. 
5 If somebody was opposing language that is 
6 consistent with the order, that party would be 
7 sanctioned. If the party was doing the opposite and 
8 attempting to put in language that shouldn't have 
9 been in there, that party would be sanctioned. And I 
10 would do this on an issue-by-issue all the way 
11 through as the stick. 
12 The -- however, when I read it last night 
13 there appears to be -- there may be one or two issues 
14 where it really does need perhaps some additional 
15 clarification. So I can't say legitimately every 
16 single issue that you guys can't agree between 
17 yourselves needs Court assistance, but there does 
18 appear to be some. And I'm trying to remember the 
19 one that stuck out in my mind. 
20 MR. GREEN: The big one, Your Honor, is, I 
21 think, life insurance. 
22 THE COURT: The life insurance. 
23 MR. GREEN: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: I t was l i f e i n s u r a n c e . 
25 MR. MOHRMAN: I t h i n k we wou ld agree t h a t 
C i t i C o u r t , LLC 
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1 that's --
2 THE COURT: And so I don't know that I can 
3 be really mad at either one of you. However, there 
4 is the one that I thinks a little bit -- the fact 
5 that the Court order didn't say that the thing would 
6 be paid on the 5th of the month, okay? The date --
7 it needs to be paid on a certain date, and we --
8 MR. MOHRMAN: We're not --
9 THE COURT: -- don't really care. 
10 MR. MOHRMAN: We don't have a problem with 
11 that at this point, Your Honor. We'd --
12 THE COURT: See what I'm saying? Put the 
13 date in and be done with it. And that's what I'm 
14 saying. 
15 If I need to get involved in something 
16 like that, then I -- then I think the day of 
17 reckoning needs to be here. 
18 MR. MOHRMAN: I think we agree. 
19 THE COURT: And that's what I'm saying. 
20 If I get over the hurdle -- if I keep the case, 
21 that's what I'm inclined to do, to let you go back 
22 and solve it and get it done, knowing that it's going 
23 to be ended and I will get in. 
24 But I will, in fairness, on those issues 
25 that you're legitimately taking some appropriate 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 stance, both of you, and you can't come to a 
2 resolution, then I would be looking to come down on 
3 somebody. But on the other issues such as that, you 
4 know --
5 And, frankly, I have to tell you a little 
6 bit where I'm coming on the -- I think Judge Roth's 
7 order was perfectly clear. He wasn't going to give 
8 credit and offsets for the house for the attorney's 
9 fees and the things against the equity in the home. 
10 I think the order is very clear on that. And I know 
11 you're alleging another agreement, but, again, the 
12 assertion is there isn't any documentation, proof or 
13 anything otherwise. So to me, that's a little bit 
14 weaker position to try to say the reason I'm holding 
15 up this finalization is is because we want that type 
16 of language contained in there because we have this 
17 agreement. If I had to call it today, I'd probably 
18 call it the other way and say that there wasn't and 
19 wouldn't give him the credit. 
20 I think you really ought to be able to 
21 figure out what the starting date is for the 102 
22 months. 
23 MR. MOHRMAN: I t seems p r e t t y o b v i o u s t o 
24 me, Your Honor , bu t - -
25 THE COURT: And t h a t ' s what I 'm s a y i n g . 
C i t l C o u r t , LLC 
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I'm willing to -- I'm willing to make the call, but I 
want to give you guys a chance to rethink your 
positions and make sure you're comfortable on your 
dates, because it is beyond me how we can have a 
starting date for the 102 months of a four-year gap 
time period from 2008 to start running possibly back 
to 2004. It's math, guys. 
And the crediting — I understand it was 
the crediting of the payment, and I understand all of 
that. But I'm saying, will you -- I think you guys 
can work that out, and I'm really hesitant to get 
involved in that. So that's my inclination. 
MR. M0HRMAN: May I ask a question, Your 
Honor? May I just briefly speak with Mr. Green for 
one second? 
THE COURT: Sure. And I'll take 
Mr. Hanson's problem. 
Mr. Hanson, come on up. 
(Recess taken.) 
MR. GREEN: Your Honor, may -- I'm sorry 
to interrupt, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: No, no. Please. 
MR. GREEN: My apologies to you. If I may 
be heard just briefly. 
I - - I'm going to forbear on any argument 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 on any issue, including the technical process issues 
2 that have been raised. It seems to me they probably 
3 ought to all be heard. And we have agreed that we 
4 will meet, at least the three of us, and Mr. Baggett 
5 will be on hand by phone, next week sometime. We're 
6 going to meet for a few minutes right now. 
7 THE COURT: To see if you can get a final 
8 order? 
9 MR. GREEN: Oh, yes. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 MR. GREEN: Oh, yes. With giving the 
12 Court thanks for your direction on these points. 
13 THE COURT: Do you want any further 
14 direction on some of these other points? 
15 MR. GREEN: You know --
16 MS. ROBINSON: Actually, yeah. 
17 MR. GREEN: I -- my client says, actually, 
18 yeah, so I - - I - -
19 THE COURT: Here's what I'm getting at: I 
20 realize that Judge Roth may have not put any specific 
21 wording in on some things, but you have to -- I think 
22 the rational approach is if some additional language 
23 is needed in order to implement what Judge Roth has 
24 asked to be done, then that's what you guys should 
25 work out between yourselves, and I really don't want 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 to get involved. 
2 For example, if he ordered the child 
3 support to be paid, we know it needs to be paid, just 
4 pick a date, okay? Just pick a date and put it in 
5 there, and I'll go with it if you guys are in 
6 agreement with it. It's not a problem. 
7 MR. MOHRMAN: It almost doesn't matter to 
8 me, Your Honor. And I --
9 THE COURT: Yeah, and -- yeah. And if 
10 it's like the 5th and the 25th or the 5th and the 
11 20th, fine. But if we have to default, we'll go with 
12 what the statute says, and I think the statute says 
13 the 5th and the 20th of each month, okay? 
14 MR. GREEN: I think the main issues we've 
15 got, setting aside the procedural posture of the 
16 case -- law of the case issues, would be the alimony 
17 issue duration and commencement date, and then this 
18 issue of offset and arrearages, and then life 
19 insurance. And the Court has given us some good --
20 well, the Court has at least acknowledged that that 
21 is an issue, that life insurance issue, and it's a 
22 bona fide issue. 
23 THE COURT: Well, the one legitimate one 
24 that sticks out in my mind that you may need some 




1 I'm not inclined at this point in time to grant the 
2 request to strike life insurance from any reference 
3 from the thing. I think Judge Roth anticipated it, 
4 he was intending to go there, and he wanted you guys 
5 an opportunity to talk about it. I don't think it 
6 was his intent to have it excluded. 
7 So if we have to go that far, I would 
8 probably -- I'm just telling you, I'm probably 
9 inclined to go in that direction. What it would be 
10 in the amounts, I don't know. And if we kick this 
11 back to Judge Roth, I don't know what he would do 
12 either. But what I'm trying to say is is I don't 
13 think it's a very realistic expectation that I would 
14 pull life insurance off the table completely when 
15 Judge Roth in his memorandum decision made known that 
16 there's going to be something there, okay? So --
17 MR. GREEN: Perhaps --
18 THE COURT: — that's as far as I'm 
19 comfortable going on the life insurance at --
20 MR. MOHRMAN: Well, and he reiterated 
21 that, Your Honor, on July 11th. He actually said 
22 that. It was the amount of what we were going to 
23 work out together. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 





2 THE COURT: All right. 
3 MR. GREEN: Perhaps, Your Honor, if we can 
4 have this meeting and then--
5 THE COURT: Should we set another date? 
6 MR. GREEN: I was going to recommend that 
7 we see what we can solve in perhaps a telephone 
8 conference with Your Honor to see what is still on 
9 the table, if anything, and then Your Honor could 
10 direct us either to Judge Roth or this courtroom to 
11 resolve any issues, if any, that survive, or another 
12 hearing. 
13 THE COURT: That's fine. No, that's fine. 
14 I was going to say if you guys would -- I have 
15 confidence you'll do it, because you have put your 
16 time and effort into it. Sometimes with counsel they 
17 say they'll do it and then they forget about it and 
18 it slips through the cracks, so --
19 MR. GREEN: We're not going to let it --
20 THE COURT: And then I sit through the 
21 follow-up court dates so --
22 MR. GREEN: Fair enough. 
23 THE COURT: -- that everybody knows it's 
24 not going to go on. So that's fine. I'll give you 




1 MR. GREEN: We're hopeful to meet early 
2 next week. 
3 MR. MOHRMAN: Early next week. 
4 MR. GREEN: But I just don't recall what 
5 my calendar is right now. 
6 THE COURT: Sure. And take some time now, 
7 because you have the couple of hours that you had set 
8 aside for this morning's hearing. 
9 I was going to go back and look at the 
10 order and try to see specifically if the -- you know, 
11 the starting date, because he had the -- my general 
12 approach is even though my memorandum decisions may 
13 come out a month or two later, or whatever, I 
14 activate it the date that I hear it, because that's 
15 the date of the trial, at least in my -- in my -- but 
16 if Judge Roth put some language in that said that 
17 it's going to be activated when he signs the order, 
18 then you've got to kind of go that direction. But, 
19 you know, I --
20 MR. GREEN: There's room for disagreement 
21 on all -- on those few points, I agree. 
22 MR. MOHRMAN: There are three possible 
23 dates, Your Honor, as I see it. And --
24 MR. GREEN: I think I can come up with 
25 a n o t h e r . 
C i t i C o u r t , LLC 
1 MR. MOHRMAN: Yeah. And the --
2 THE COURT: Pick the one that you both 
3 don't like and you're probably --
4 MR. MOHRMAN: I think there's one in the 
5 middle that we both don't like. 
6 THE COURT: -- you're probably -- you're 
7 probably pretty fair. 
8 Okay. Anything else I can try to do? 
9 MR. GREEN: I think if we can stick to 
10 this plan, I think maybe once and for all we'll be 
11 done. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. MOHRMAN: Would it be okay with Your 
14 Honor if once we've had -- we're going to meet today 
15 preliminarily, and then try to meet one more time, 
16 and then hopefully we can hammer out a final document 
17 for you. But if -- as soon as we're completed, 
18 either we don't have a meeting of the minds or we 
19 have a mostly meeting of the minds and maybe one 
20 issue or something, maybe just call you on the 
21 telephone and schedule, or call Pat and have a -- get 
22 a schedule -- a telephone conference with you? 
23 THE COURT: Sure. 
24 MR. MOHRMAN: Is that — 




1 MR. MOHRMAN: We'd like to do that. 
2 THE COURT: I'll help you any way I can. 
3 You know, you both understand it needs to be 
4 concluded, and I'm sure you'd both like it off your 
5 desk. Both the parties would like to have something 
6 firm in place that they can go, and there's something 
7 to be said for that. And I just wanted to make sure, 
8 because we haven't had really any involvement before 
9 with one another, that we're not trying to be so 
10 technical in things that it was a stumbling block to 
11 implementing what was there. Take a step back, look 
12 at the bigger picture and put it in place. If we 
13 have a stepping stone or two that's missing, put it 
14 in that you guys agree to get with Judge Roth once, 
15 because ultimately, that's where I'm going to end up 
16 is with Judge Roth, said as best as I can, so --
17 MR. GREEN: May I, keeping in mind what 
18 the Court just said, indicate that we're happy to go 
19 through this process, we think it will succeed, but I 
20 would hate to have anybody think or suggest later 
21 that my client's agreeability to this approach is any 
22 sort of a waiver as to her legal arguments. 
23 THE COURT: So noted. 
24 MR. MOHRMAN: I certainly would say --





























MR. MOHRMAN: -- that's not the case. 
THE COURT: So noted for the record. 
All right. Thank you very much. 
MR. MOHRMAN: And, likewise, Your Honor, 





All right. Thank you. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. MOHRMAN: Thank you for your time. 
THE COURT: You're welcome. 
MR. MOHRMAN: I appreciate it very much. 
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Addendum G 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY L. ROBINSON, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Petitioner, : CASE NO. 034901865 
vs. : 
ALEXANDER EARL BAGGETT, : 
Respondent. : 
The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
Respondent seeking a ruling on his Motion for Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) 
Relief. The Court notes that the Respondent requests a hearing on this 
Motion. However, the Court determines that since the parties' written 
submissions adequately detail their respective legal positions, a hearing 
is not necessary and would not be of assistance to the Court. Therefore, 
having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
The Respondent's Motion pertains to his failure to timely object to 
the Petitioner's proposed Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce ("Amended Decree"). The 
undersigned Judge entered the Amended Decree on April 11, 2008, after 
this case was transferred to him from Judge Roth. The Respondent's 
ROBINSON V. BAGGETT PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
counsel, Michael K. Mohrman, has filed an Affidavit, attesting that after 
receiving a proposed version of the Amended Decree, he wrote to opposing 
counsel, outlining the parties' disagreements. Mr. Mohrman maintains 
that he intended to timely object, but did not realize that the proposed 
Amended Decree had been filed with the Court until April 24, 2008, when 
his client notified him that a judgment had been entered against him. 
In reviewing the correspondence provided by the Respondent and the 
Petitioner, there are certain facts that become clear. First, after 
extensive delays in entering a final set of documents in this case, the 
Petitioner's counsel informed Mr. Mohrman that he would be filing the 
proposed Amended Decree "on or before April 2, 2008." In a letter, dated 
March 28, 2008, Mr. Mohrman replied: "I will have the objection to you 
no later than Tuesday April 1st." On April 1, 2008, Mr. Mohrman's 
colleague contacted the Petitioner's counsel and requested an extension. 
This request was denied and, as counsel had previously promised, the 
Amended Decree was submitted to the Court on April 3, 2008. 
Notably, Mr. Mohrman attests in his Affidavit that on April 4, 2008, 
his office received a letter from the Petitioner's counsel addressed to 
Judge Roth, indicating that the Amended Decree was enclosed. Despite 
this clear notice that the Amended Decree had been submitted, counsel did 
nothing further until April 28, 2008, when he filed the Motion requesting 
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relief. According to Mr. Mohrman's Affidavit, he did not see the April 
4, 2008, letter and he is not certain as to why he did not review it when 
it was received. 
In light of the foregoing, the Court determines that the 
Respondent's failure to timely object to the proposed Amended Decree is 
inexcusable. Counsel was clearly aware that objections were due, he 
agreed himself to file such objections by April 1, 2 008, and, once an 
extension was denied, counsel's alternatives were to either submit the 
objections or seek leave of the Court for additional time. Counsel did 
neither. Further, counsel cannot rely on surprise or mistake because by 
April 4, 2008, by the latest, he was clearly informed that the proposed 
Amended Decree had been submitted to the Court. There is no reasonable 
excuse for not taking action at that point and, having failed to do so, 
the Respondent effectively waived any right to complain or otherwise 
object to the Amended Decree or its entry in the proposed form. Overall, 
the Court is satisfied that there are no legal or factual grounds to 
grant the Respondent's requested relief, even assuming that his Motion 
is timely and procedurally appropriate (a big assumption under these 
circumstances). Accordingly, the Respondent's Motion is denied. 
ROBINSON V. BAGGETT PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
Dated this JL ^ V day of June, 2008. 
ROBERT P. FAUST - ^ > ^ ^ 
DISTRICT COURT JU^£^?{ S ^^^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this^s) day of June, 2008: 
Frederick N. Green 
Attorney for Petitioner 
7390 S. Creek Road, Suite 104 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Michael K. Mohrman 
Attorney for Respondent 
175 S. Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
